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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Winter storms have increased in frequency and intensity since the 1950s and average annual
precipitation is projected to continue to increase across the northern United States (Melillo et al., 2014).
In response to these trends, many states have developed, or are interested in developing, emergencyresponse plans for extreme winter storm events. This report provides a series of six emergencyresponse plan case studies as well as a synthesis of best practices related to emergency-response
planning for extreme winter weather. It is intended to provide a blueprint for transportation agencies
seeking to develop or improve their own extreme winter weather emergency-response plans, including
how to coordinate an effective response across multiple agencies and jurisdictions.
In order to identify state DOTs and other entities that had written emergency-response plans for severe
winter weather, a survey was distributed to Clear Roads members, the AASHTO snow and ice listserv,
and staff at state DEMs in Clear Roads’ member states. In total, 52 individuals responded to the survey.
The reported status of emergency-response plans for winter weather for responding state DOTs are
shown below.

After email follow-up with the 18 DOT respondents reporting that their agencies had a written plan, 8
written plans were obtained for review (Colorado, Minnesota, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas and Vermont). An additional web search for statewide DEM “all-hazard” plans was
conducted to supplement the survey, given the relatively low response rate by emergency managers.
(Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, New York).
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Based on the reviews, interview-based case studies were conducted for the following six states:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Colorado
Georgia
Michigan
New York State
Pennsylvania
South Dakota

The in-depth interview process was particularly valuable for gathering detailed information about (1) the
organizational structure of the DOT section responsible for the plan, (2) plan implementation, and (3)
the differing approaches of the case study subjects to managing an emergency response to extreme
winter storms. In addition to the six state case studies, a brief overview of the role of the I-95 Corridor
Coalition in facilitating cross-jurisdictional response planning is also included.
A framework of recommended best practices was distilled from the six interview-based case studies to
provide a roadmap for other DOTs creating or updating their own written emergency-response plan for
extreme winter weather. Best practices that were common to multiple case studies and easily
transferable to other jurisdictions were included in the framework. The nine best practices identified in
the case studies fell into two general categories, summarized in the table below.
Category

Organization & Communication

Planning, Training, and Review

Recommended Best Practice
DOT Office(r) of Emergency Management
Pre-Event Structured Conference Calls
Public Communications Plan
Extensive road-weather information systems (RWIS) and
automatic vehicle location (AVL) Coverage
Regional Coalitions
Scalable RSIC Operations Plan
Legal Authority for Road Restrictions
Threat Identification and Assessment
Formalized Training and Review

E-2

INTRODUCTION
Emergency-response planning is defined as strategy for minimizing adverse impacts on public safety and
economic activity from anthropogenic and natural disasters. It has its origins in Cold-War-era nuclear
preparedness planning and now includes planning for many incident types (Alexander, 2002). Extreme
winter weather is not currently a well-developed area for emergency-response planning. The two
natural disasters identified in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Planning
Scenarios, for example, are major hurricanes and earthquakes (FEMA, 2009). Nonetheless, the
frequency and intensity of winter storms have increased since the 1950s and average annual
precipitation is projected to continue to increase across the northern United States (Melillo et al., 2014).
Consequently, many states have developed or are interested in developing emergency-response plans
for severe winter storms.
In the context of natural events, an emergency can be defined as “an exceptional event that exceeds the
capacity of normal resources and organization to cope with it” (Alexander, 2002). State departments of
transportation (DOTs) are well prepared to manage most winter storms with routine roadway snow and
ice control (RSIC) resources, so most winter storms do not rise to level of an emergency. Only the most
severe winter storms – or storms that coincide with other hazards such as an industrial accident
(Mendonca, Beroggi, and Wallace, 2001) – will require implementation of an emergency-response plan
when the DOTs resources would otherwise be overwhelmed. During emergencies, the transportation
system must be capable of facilitating several key activities to protect public safety and minimize
economic disruption. These activities, adapted from (Litman, 2006), include:
•
•
•
•

Ensuring ability to deliver emergency supplies and services (including police/fire)
Maintaining access to critical infrastructure/facilities, like hospitals and power stations
Maintaining capacity of evacuation routes
Facilitating infrastructure repair

Winter storms present a different set of challenges relative to other natural disaster types. Heavy
snowfall, especially when accompanied by high winds, causes drifting snow and poor visibility.
Sidewalks, streets, and highways can become hazardous to pedestrians and motorists. Extreme low
temperatures can exacerbate these effects and make infrastructure and isolated populations more
vulnerable. Winter storms generally do not cause the same degree of infrastructure damage as other
natural disasters and rarely require population evacuations. However, they can be longer lasting and
wider in geographic coverage than other types of natural disasters. The uniformity of the damage
caused by severe winter storms also has a more disruptive effect on mobility than more localized
disruptions from, for example, flooding. Damage to infrastructure can include power outages, while
personal safety and mobility impacts include increased accident rates, increased travel times, coldinduced injuries and inability for relief services to respond to vulnerable populations.
Because winter storms limit mobility, RSIC resources are needed to maintain access to critical
infrastructure, including hospitals, power facilities such as sub-stations, and fueling facilities (especially
for RSIC vehicles themselves). During extreme winter storms, standard RSIC resources are stressed by
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this task. For example, in the winter of 2015, a series of extreme storms in Massachusetts resulted in the
activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) for 28 consecutive days. Record snowfall
resulted in multiple State of Emergency declarations, travel bans and extensive deployment of
Massachusetts State Police and National Guard resources (MEMA, 2015). In spite of intensive RSIC at the
state and local levels and Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) support from five
neighboring states, the storms caused extensive, long-term transit and highway closures (MEMA, 2015).
A variety of services are integral to a safe and effective response during a severe-to-extreme winter
storm event:
•
•
•
•

State Police
Fire and Rescue
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Incident Command System (ICS)
RSIC Operations

In many states, these services are coordinated and integrated through the SEOC in times of emergency
(VDPS, 2015). Following the National Response Framework (NRF), response resources and services are
frequently organized around Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), structures that coordinate the
delivery of core emergency response capabilities (DHS, 2016). Although DOT operations personnel are
included in the ESF structure and active in emergency operations, it is not clear how RSIC services are
coordinated with first responders and relief providers. Since RSIC services are normally coordinated out
of local “districts” or “service areas”, there are also jurisdictional challenges associated with
coordinating RSIC response. During extreme winter weather, RSIC response typically requires the
support of RSIC personnel and equipment from districts that are not directly affected by the storm,
potentially including mutual aid from districts outside the affected state(s). Beginning in 2006, all subrecipients of Homeland Security Grants were encouraged to form mutual aid agreements as a condition
of receiving federal preparedness funds.
1.1 GOALS OF THE PROJECT
The goal of this project is to provide a synthesis of best practices in emergency-response planning for
extreme winter weather for transportation agencies seeking to develop or improve their own
emergency-response plans. To achieve this goal, this project uses a case study approach that facilitates
the identification of best practices and provides concrete examples of the practices in action. These case
studies, and the recommended best practices drawn from them, are intended to provide the blueprints
for how an effective response will be coordinated between multiple agencies and jurisdictions who may
not normally interact on a day-to-day basis.
1.2 BACKGROUND
The NRF includes five emergency-preparedness components - mitigation, response, recovery, protection
and prevention (DHS, 2016). The focus of this project is specifically on the response aspect of
emergency-preparedness planning, which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines as the
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activities “necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs
after an incident has occurred” (DHS, 2016).
The NRF articulates five “guiding principles” as the basis for incident responses (DHS, 2016). These are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

engaged partnership
tiered response
scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities
unity of effort through unified command
readiness to act

Collectively, these principles emphasize the importance of clear and effective coordination among
stakeholders, flexibility in bringing additional resources to bear, as well as preparation and training. In
addition to state, local and federal emergency responders and DOTs, stakeholders include the public and
the business community. In the context of extreme winter weather, effective communication with
businesses and the traveling public about road conditions and travel restrictions can reduce accidents
and congestion and improve the ability of DOTs to perform critical RSIC operations. Flexible operational
capabilities can include seamlessly increasing staff and implementing overtime for RSIC operators,
shifting resources from low- to high-priority roadways, efficiently using RSIC contractors, and requesting
assistance from neighboring jurisdictions, through an EMAC for example. State and local resources are
often managed using ICSs that coordinate response activities through EOCs (DHS, 2016).
The response process itself is an iterative process of information-gathering, resource
activation/deployment, and coordination of response activities. Effective response efforts are supported
by a preparedness process that includes developing a plan, organizing and training personnel,
conducting training exercises, and evaluating and improving the response plan (DHS, 2008).
Academic sources emphasize that ongoing review of the emergency-response plan is essential and that
the planning process should not be considered complete simply because a written plan has been
produced (Perry and Lindell, 2003). A written plan only represents the state of the planning process at
the time that it is produced, so it needs to be part of a continuing process of testing and revision. This
ongoing process combats complacency and the inherent human tendency to underestimate the
likelihood of infrequent events. Perry and Lindell (2003) also distinguish the process of planning from
the management phase of a response, which occurs during the event itself. A written plan should also
include standard operating procedures (SOPs) for management of the response once an emergency
arises.
In addition to the direct impacts caused by extreme winter storms – notably the loss of mobility due to
the accumulation of snow and ice on roads or from diminished visibility while driving – the operation of
the transporation system can be further compromised by other factors. These factors include failure to
provide clear instructions to the public, failure of the public to comply with instructions, and failure to
maintain access to transit and to fuel, all of which occurred during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The
transportation system is critical to public safety, especially when the needs of those without basic
mobility options are considered (Litman, 2006).
3

1.3 REPORT SUMMARY
Chapter 2 describes the survey and literature review process that were used to identify specific case
studies for this project. It includes a review of the survey results, the written emergency-response plans
obtained for review, and the written all-hazard plans that were discovered with specific attention to
extreme winter storms, as well as a recommendation for the case studies to be pursued. Chapter 3
presents the interview-based case studies that are the source of the recommended best practices
summarized in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 describes the overall project conclusions and needs for future
research.
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SURVEY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to support the development of guidance on emergency-response planning for extreme winter
weather, this chapter describes the process of identifying potential case studies subjects through a
literature review and survey. It contains:
•
•
•
•

Overview of Survey Results and Written DOT Plans Obtained for Review
Review of Written DOT Plans
Overview of Written All-Hazard Plans
Recommended Set of Case Studies

2.1 OVERVIEW OF SURVEY RESULTS AND WRITTEN DOT PLANS OBTAINED FOR REVIEW
In order to identify DOTs and other entities that have written emergency-response plans for severe
winter weather, a survey was distributed to Clear Roads members, the AASHTO snow and ice listserv,
and staff at the state DEMs in all Clear Roads’ member states. In total, 52 respondents completed at
least a portion of the survey. These respondents included 30 DOT or local public-works personnel, but
only two respondents from state departments of emergency management. The reported status of
emergency-response plans for winter weather events for responding state DOTs are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Status of emergency-response plans for state DOTs participating in the project survey
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Twenty three of the respondents answered “yes“ when asked if their state had a written plan for
emergency response to extreme winter storms. Twenty of these responses came from state DOTs,
representing 19 different states (one state had two “yes” responses). However, the Michigan
respondent failed to provide contact info. So a total of 18 states (shown in Figure 1) were confirmed to
have responded affirmatively. Two local agencies also responded with a “yes”, but one of them failed to
provide contact info and the other failed to respond to the follow up. The final affirmative response
came from a vendor.
Note that in three of the 18 cases, one respondent from the state DOT reported that the agency did
have a written emergency-response plan while a second respondent from the same DOT reported that
the agency did not have a plan or only had an informal plan. These types of contradictions reinforce the
need for emergency-response plans that are well integrated throughout multiple state agency’s
operations.
Survey respondents primarily listed specific weather criteria as the trigger for their emergency response
plan, as opposed to a FEMA or Governor’s declaration. Specific triggers included:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Storm severity
Forecasted or anticipated weather
Over 8 inches of snow in 24 hours or less
Impacts to critical routes or other roadway conditions
Standing agreement with the local airport
Determination made at the district level

Most respondents who affirmed that they have a written plan felt that it covered intra-agency
communications, demobilization of resources, and after-action review well, but did not cover the
shifting of resources or updating the plan well. Nor did they feel that their plans covered life-safety
measures for stranded travelers or vulnerable residents.
After email follow-up with the 18 DOT respondents reporting that their agencies had a written plan,
eight respondents provided a copy of the written plan(s) they referred to in the survey:
•

•
•

Colorado:
o Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT): Threat and Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment, March 2017
o CDOT: Emergency Operations Plan, June 2017 (Draft)
o CDOT: Standard Operating Procedures, August 2017 (Draft)
o Colorado Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Management: Colorado Hazard
and Incident Response and Recovery Plan, November 2016
Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) Department-Wide Snow and Ice Plan,
Season: 2017 – 2018, June 2017
New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT): Emergency Transportation Operations
Playbook, Revised October 2016
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•
•

•
•
•

New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT): Operations Winter Readiness Levels
(Undated)
Pennsylvania:
o Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT): All-Hazards Incident
Management System Manual, December 2014
o PennDOT Bureau of Maintenance and Operations Maintenance Manual, Chapter 9:
Emergency Operations, Updated 4/15
South Dakota Department of Transportation (SDDOT): Winter Highway Maintenance Plan, 20162017, October 2016
Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT): Texas Snow and Ice Control Plan, TxDOT
Maintenance Division-Winter Storm Committee (Undated)
Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans): Emergency Operations Plan, September 2015

An additional web search for state all-hazard plans or statewide emergency-response plans was
conducted to supplement the survey, given the relatively low response rate by emergency managers.
Since all-hazard plans contain considerably less detail about individual incidents than a DOT response
plan would, the review of these plans was limited to four states:
•
•
•
•
•

Georgia: Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency Winter Weather
Incident Annex S - Georgia Emergency Operations Plan, 9/7/2016
Michigan: Michigan Emergency Management Plan, February 6, 2017
Minnesota: State of Minnesota Emergency Operations Plan (Official), Revised September 1,
2013
New York: 2014 New York State Hazard Mitigation Plan, January 2014
New Jersey: State of New Jersey 2014 Hazard Mitigation Plan

The written DOT plans are reviewed in Chapter 2.2. Since the Colorado DHSEM (DHSEM, 2016) is not a
DOT plan, it is discussed with the other all-hazard plans in Chapter 2.3.
2.2 REVIEW OF WRITTEN DOT PLANS
2.2.1 Colorado
The survey respondent from the Colorado DOT provided three separate written DOT documents
pertaining to emergency-response to extreme winter weather. The 2017 Colorado Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (CDOT, 2017a) addresses most of the threats and hazards that
transportation faces in Colorado, including severe winter weather. This is a supporting document to the
overall State Hazard Mitigation Plan. The specific maintenance regions where threats of severe winter
weather are highest are identified, and very specific definitions/distinctions are made between winterweather hazards that involve extreme winter precipitation, extremely strong winter winds, and
extremely low winter temperatures. Based on these distinctions, the document includes a temporal
chart indicating which hazards are present in which month of the year. Projected impacts of severe
winter weather, ice and sleet, snowstorms, severe winds, extreme cold, and avalanche are itemized
7

separately for the public, first responders, infrastructure, the economy, the environment, public
confidence, and DOT operations.
The 2017 Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) (CDOT, 2017b) is the first of its kind prepared by CDOT, with
a focus on state transportation-agency responsibilities during an emergency. It includes specific
definitions of the terms snow advisory, wind chill advisory/warning, and winter storm
advisory/watch/warning, along with a specific description of the scope of a “winter storm”:
Hazardous winter weather includes events related to heavy snow, blowing
snow, ice, sleet or freezing rain, and extreme cold temperatures. Blizzards are
severe winter storms that pack a combination of blowing snow and wind
resulting in very low visibilities.
Its preparedness procedures also cover avalanche control as a mitigation measure.
The 2017 Draft Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (CDOT, 2017c) cover severe winter weather in
SOPs relating to Crisis Communication Planning, Incident Action Planning, and the Winter Operations
Conference Call. The SOP for the Winter Operations Conference Call includes additional detail on the
roles and responsibilities of entities within CDOT and other state agencies, a concept of operations with
a list of specific participants for the calls, and a decision tree for determining the “incident level”, which
dictates the initial set of communications and whether a conference call is needed.
2.2.2 Minnesota
The MnDOT 2017 – 2018 Snow and Ice Plan (MnDOT, 2017) identifies class-specific performancemeasure targets for RSIC, which enable RSIC resources to be concentrated preferentially on the highest
priority roadways during severe winter-weather events. The plan also allows for scaling of the RSIC
resources deployed depending on storm severity, describing split-shift and overtime policies that can be
implemented when severe winter-weather is forecasted. It states that MnDOT RSIC trucks are estimated
to be sufficient to meet its level of service targets given “moderately severe” winter-weather events.
Extreme events are not specifically addressed in the plan nor is interagency communication or
collaboration discussed.
2.2.3 New Jersey
New Jersey DOT provided a 2-page “readiness plan” for RSIC activities (NJDOT, 2017). The plan dictates
the activation of RSIC in response to escalating storm conditions. Level 1 is a monitoring level that
provides for “eyeballs on the road and the sky.” At this level, RSIC crews and contractors have not
generally been activated. Level 4 is the highest level of operational readiness in which all available
resources are being utilized for RSIC operations. Level 5 readiness is for extreme winter storms and
provides a framework for decision-making regarding states of emergency, travel bans, towing edicts,
state office closures, shelter-in-place protocols, and activating of RSIC contractors, on-call drivers and
commercial resources. The Level 5 readiness level is only implemented when forecasts predict a
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combination of high snowfall rates (> 2” per hour), long storm durations, high total accumulations (>
20“) and high winds. Under these conditions, RSIC crews would be expected to struggle to keep roads
clear, county and local RSIC resources are likely to be overwhelmed and motorist stranding could be
common. The plan allows for the flexible escalation of resources as needed and includes a protocol for
changes in readiness levels, and roles for both state and regional EOCs. Collaboration with adjoining
states, communication with the public and specific allocation of resources to critical infrastructure are
not directly addressed in the plan.
2.2.4 New York
The NYSDOT Emergency Transportation Operations Playbook (NYSDOT, 2016) governs NYSDOT response
to incidents of all types using an Incident Command System structure outlined in the National Incident
Management System. Preparedness is managed through the Statewide Transportation Information &
Coordination Center, which has capacity for expanded staffing during major events in order to
coordinate with the state Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and other agencies and coordinate
the deployment of resources. Transportation Management Centers are responsible for the coordination
of operational activities and coordination with state and local police. The Playbook also outlines
NYSDOT’s ability to implement pre-emptive travel bans and other travel restrictions.
Routine winter maintenance at NYSDOT is governed by “Snow and Ice Control Guidelines”. The Snow
and Ice Guidelines mandate regional operational plans, most of which include additional contingencies
for equipment failures, snow showers/squalls, and assistance to adjacent jurisdictions. RSIC plans also
have pre-planned enhanced-response components for storms with a forecasted intensity of greater than
1.5 inches per hour, which includes provisions for double coverage of critical highway-segments by
shifting resources.
2.2.5 Pennsylvania
PennDOT’s role in emergency-response to all types of natural disasters is laid out in Chapter 9:
Emergency-Response of the DOT’s Maintenance Manual (PennDOT, 2015). DOT response duties include
participating in the three regional EOCs, collecting and reporting information on damage/disruption to
the transportation system (including road, air, rail and bus facilities), assisting in the distribution of
emergency fuel supplies, and designating emergency routes. Debris removal (including removal of snow)
is identified as a key responsibility of the DOT.
2.2.6 South Dakota
The South Dakota Winter Highway Maintenance Plan for 2016-2017 (SDDOT, 2016) includes the
emergency procedures for severe winter weather. It stipulates that traffic can be restricted or closed on
sections of highway under extreme circumstance. It also provides guidelines for how to communicate
these restrictions and travel advisories to the public, for coordination with state police and emergencyresponders and for overtime assignment. As with other states, it includes a road prioritization system
that permits resources to be diverted preferentially from non-priority roads and a policy to reassign
9

equipment to neighboring areas during major winter events. The state has a written policy for assisting
stranded motorists.
In the event of a winter-weather emergency, South Dakota can activate its EOC to facilitate
communication and decision-making. The EOC typically includes the Department of Public Safety, the
Department of Transportation, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and the South
Dakota National Guard.
2.2.7 Texas
The TxDOT Snow and Ice Control Plan (TxDOT, 2017) calls for the activation of the Maintenance Division
EOC when a winter storm is forecasted to affect multiple districts. The EOC is intended to coordinate
movement of RSIC personnel and resources to impacted areas. During major winter storms, the State
Operation Center, which is different from the Maintenance Division EOC, may be active as well to
provide additional support, by coordinating the activities of the Texas A&M Forest Service, Texas
Military Forces, Texas Parks & Wildlife and the Department of Public Safety. Each district is directed to
establish an emergency-response team to address issues within its own district and to assist other
districts.
2.2.8 Vermont
The VTrans Emergency Transportation Operations Plan (VTRANS, 2015) is intended to provide a
framework for managing Agency resource during responses to a wide range of incidents. It includes
sections on planning and preparedness, response, and post-incident revision of the plan. It also includes
a description of the structure and function of the Incident Command System in Vermont. Regardless of
the incident type, the Agency is responsible for monitoring the status of the road network and other
transportation infrastructure and reporting it to the state EOC.
2.3 OVERVIEW OF WRITTEN ALL-HAZARD PLANS
FEMA provides guidance on the development of all-hazard EOPs (FEMA 2010). These plans include a
basic plan, which is in place for all emergency types and provides an overview of response policies,
agencies and responsibilities. In addition, the EOP should include hazard/incident specific “incident
annexes” that address operational response to individual threats. This overview focuses on the incident
annexes pertaining to extreme winter storms in the all-hazard EOPs for Colorado, Georgia, Michigan,
Minnesota and New York.
2.3.1 Colorado
The 2016 Colorado Hazard and Incident Response and Recovery Plan (DHSEM, 2016) is the statewide
EOP that is used at the EOC in Colorado when an emergency is activated. It covers both response and
recovery, highlighting the interaction amongst the various state agencies. It mentions severe winter
storms as a frequent major event requiring disaster declaration, and includes a winter-storm incident
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annex, describing who will be the lead agency, what assumptions have gone into planning for the
incident, and what the specific roles and responsibilities are for other agencies. A “Concept of
Operations” is also provided, with general guidance on the goals of the response and the general roles
of other state agencies and state agency partners (non-government organizations and private entities).
2.3.2 Georgia
The Georgia EOP includes a winter-weather incident annex that provides an overview of how the state
coordinates response to significant winter-weather incidents (GEMA/HS, 2016). The annex recognizes
that while winter weather does not pose a significant problem every winter, the state has experienced
winter-weather events (especially related to ice) that have overwhelmed its emergency-response and
RSIC capabilities. The document’s Concept of Operations lays out five levels of operational preparedness
that are triggered by forecasted weather conditions, as well as coordination between GEMA/HS and
GDOT.
2.3.3 Michigan
The Michigan Emergency Management Plan includes a disaster-specific procedure for severe winter
weather (MSP/EMHSD, 2016). This procedure identifies four winter-weather hazards that occur in
Michigan: snowstorms, blizzards, extreme cold, and ice storms. These hazards are assessed based on the
potential extent and duration of the storm, number of injuries and fatalities,
property/environmental/agricultural damage, impacts on infrastructure, and resources required for
response and recovery. In addition to assessing the severity of the weather event, the severe winterweather procedure identifies mechanisms for notifying the public and requesting federal assistance.
MDOT is also identified as the lead agency for public works and engineering ESFs for all disaster types.
These support functions include RSIC and other infrastructure maintenance operations.
2.3.4 Minnesota
The Minnesota Emergency Operations Plan identifies blizzards as a threat to the state but does not
include annexes for specific hazards (MnDPS/HSEM, 2013). The EOP does identify a public awareness
campaign for winter hazards and describes the specific DOT responsibility for debris removal and
maintenance of evacuation/supply routes for multiple emergency types (other than winter-weather
emergencies).
2.3.5 New York
The New York State Hazard Mitigation Plan recognizes severe winter weather as a high probability event
but characterizes it as a low threat due to the low potential for loss of life relative to other disaster types
(NYSDHSES, 2014). It provides an extensive summary of historical storm events, probabilities for future
events and identifies the Northeast Snowfall Impact Scale as an effective means for assessing storm
severity (Squires and Lawrimore, 2006).
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2.3.6 New Jersey
The State of New Jersey 2014 Hazard Mitigation Plan has a section dedicated to assessing risk from
severe winter weather, which are defined to include heavy snow, blizzards, and ice storms (Tetra Tech,
2014). They utilize the Regional Snowfall Index ranking categories, created by National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (Squires et. al., 2014) to assess the risk from heavy snowfall. Risks to human
life are identified as traffic crashes, heart attacks due to over-exertion, and prolonged exposure to cold.
It also includes a detailed catalog of winter weather emergencies historically, along with a monetary
estimate of the potential losses across many sectors, including transportation. Since it is a mitigation
plan, this document contains little to no information on response, but does include some important
elements that could be used to develop a plan or incident annex.
2.4 RECOMMENDED SET OF CASE STUDIES
State DOTs are at significantly different stages of development in emergency-response planning for
extreme winter weather. Existing plans are highly variable in their level of detail, and coordination of
plans between DOTs and emergency management agencies is not always evident. The following features
were identified through the review as critical components of a state’s emergency-response plan for
extreme winter-weather events:
1) Criteria for winter-storm severity classified by event type – snow, wind, ice, and low temperature
2) An initial communication kickoff event, like a Winter Storm Conference Call
3) Clarification about whether the DOT has the responsibility to reduce speed limits and/or close
sections of roadway
4) Temporal (monthly) and geographic (by district) identification of threats by event type
5) An RSIC resource-supplementation plan describing how split-shifts, overtime policies, contractors,
regional resource-shifting and out-of-state assistance are to be implemented or engaged in extreme
winter-weather
6) A specific plan for reducing/focusing the scope of RSIC to the most critical routes/facilities
7) Emergency procedures that dictate how the DOTs RSIC procedures will be coordinated with:
a) The state’s EOC and the DEM
b) State police and emergency-responders
8) A winter-weather incident annex, as usually contained in the state’s all-hazard plan, with procedures
for organizing and training personnel, conducting training exercises, and evaluating and improving
the response plan
9) A communication/coordination plan that includes state and local responders, emergency managers,
RSIC operations staff, the public, non-profits, and major employers
10) Scalability for use by states with frequent severe winter storms as well as those for whom winter
storms are less frequent
11) Consistent terminology, for better coordination of resources and sharing of written plan materials
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Based on the emergency-response survey, the follow-up contact with DOT staff and the literature
review, the research team recommended case studies on the development of written plans in the
following states:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Colorado
New York State
South Dakota
Georgia
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Michigan
Texas

Each of these states has made significant progress in planning around the threat of winter-weather
emergencies, but each has focused on a different aspect of the planning.
The importance of inter-agency coordination is stressed in all emergency planning documents, but
multi-state engagement seems to be an area where improvements specifically related to winter storms
can be made. The I-95 Corridor Coalition (http://i95coalition.org/) is a cooperative multi-state
organization that has developed around issues of transportation management and operation in the I-95
corridor. TRANSCOM (https://xcm.org/XCMWebSite/Index.aspx) is a coalition of 16 transportation and
public safety agencies in the New York – New Jersey – Connecticut metropolitan region. It was created
in 1986 to provide a cooperative, coordinated approach to regional transportation management. The
research team also recommends an informal review of the capabilities of these types of organizations in
facilitating resource and information sharing among states during extreme storms.
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INTERVIEWS AND CASE STUDIES
This chapter presents the interview-based case studies for six state DOTs:
•
•
•
•
•
•

South Dakota
Colorado
Pennsylvania
Georgia
New York
Michigan

Attempts to connect with representatives from New Jersey and Texas were unsuccessful through the
end of November 2017, so those potential case studies are not included. The results of an informal
review of the potential role of the I-95 Corridor Coalition in facilitating cross-jurisdictional response
planning is included.
For most of the interviews, the interviewee was the respondent to the initial survey, but in several cases
additional personnel also participated in the interviews. Two of the states included in the case-study
analysis, Georgia and Michigan, did not participate in the initial survey but were identified by reviewing
their all-hazard plan through an open literature search. For these two states, additional efforts were
required to find the most suitable person to interview about their plans.
The interview process consisted of two sets questions. The first set of questions followed-up on the
initial survey and/or were designed to gather additional details about each states’ emergency-response
planning beyond what had been uncovered in the literature review and survey tasks. The questions
asked in this portion of the interview varied from state to state. In the cases of Georgia and Michigan,
this part of the interview covered the questions from the initial survey.
The second set of questions in the interviews were developed following the case-study process outlined
by Erskine et al. (1997) and are intended to understand big-picture issues around winter emergencyresponse planning in each state and to help others learn through the case-study presentation method.
These questions, which were repeated in every interview, were:
1. Define the Issue: What is the issue or event that prompted the development of the written plan(s)?
2. Describe the Background / Analyze Case Data: What is the history of your agency’s activity in this
area? How have winter weather emergencies been handled in the past?
3. Generate Alternatives: What are some of the things that your agency can do better? What
tools/resources do you need?
4. Describe the Proposed Solution: Is there an intent to incorporate currently omitted critical
components of emergency planning for severe winter storm events?
The fifth step is Erskine’s case study process is to make recommendations. Final recommendations from
the case-study analysis are in Chapter 4.
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3.1 SOUTH DAKOTA CASE STUDY
Dan Varilek, Winter Maintenance Specialist with the
South Dakota DOT, responded to the initial survey for
this project (see sidebar). His response prompted the
review of the South Dakota Winter Highway
Maintenance Plan for 2016-2017 (SDDOT, 2016), which
includes the emergency procedures for severe winter
weather, in addition to the procedures for normal RSIC
operations.
Dan Varilek and Greg Fuller, Director of the Division of
Operations at SDDOT, participated in a follow-up
interview on November 13, 2017. The results of this
interview are presented below, with questions in bold
and answers in italics.
3.1.1 Follow-Up to Survey Responses:
Additional Details
Emergency procedures for RSIC are activated “At the
direction or request of the Secretary and/or Director of
Operations via the Region Engineer,” (page 21) – Does
the Secretary or Director of Operations make that call?
Is the EOC activation a key indicator of an emergency?
Is the South Dakota OEM responsible for activating the
EOC? Why might they activate it during a major winter
storm? Is all communication with other agencies
handled through the EOC when an emergency is
occurring? Other than the state police, are any other
agencies communicated with outside the EOC?
Within the DOT, the communication follows a chain of
command from the area engineers, up to the four region
engineers, who report to the Director (Greg Fuller). When
the area engineers run into issues with equipment or
personnel, they begin the process of going up that chain
of command to the Director, who makes the call to shift
resources. Therefore, the request to move resources
between districts comes directly from the users of
resources at the lowest level. Although this is a form of
response, it is not related to the activation of the EOC.
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SOUTH DAKOTA SURVEY RESULTS
What are the "trigger criteria" for
implementing the response plan? Governor’s
Declaration and Local/County Declaration
Does the plan include specific rules for
communication between
jurisdictions/agencies to facilitate the
response? Yes
Are the roles of each jurisdiction/agency
clearly defined? Yes
Are any documented memoranda of
understanding between agencies available?
Yes
Does the plan cover communication between
snow and ice control managers and emergency
responders (e.g. police, fire and rescue and
regional emergency managers)? Yes
Does the plan call for an agency representative
to staff or report to local jurisdiction
emergency operations centers? Yes
Does the plan specifically address life-safety
measures necessary for stranded travelers
and/or vulnerable residents? Yes
How are resources demobilized after the event
is over and the response has been completed?
We touch base with our Area Engineers to
determine what equipment is necessary to
open up the roads. Once established our fleet
manager will arrange for equipment to be
transferred to those areas for use. Once the
area is deemed safe for public transit, the
equipment will be transferred back to its
original home.
Are processes (either formal or informal) in
place to review emergency-response
performance after completion of emergency
operations? Yes

The evaluation process for the EOC begins prior to the storm. Since the South Dakota Highway Patrol
(SDHP) are not part of SDDOT, both agencies get on a conference call when a major winter storm is
forecasted, along with National Weather Service (NWS) forecasters. Until the storm hits, the conference
call is the primary means of communication. As SDDOT is receiving information from the area engineers,
it is being shared on the conference call with the SDHP. Once the storm begins, if SDDOT is finding that
more urgent action is needed, like closing a section of highway, then a decision might be made to
activate the EOC.
EOC activations have different levels. For a routine blizzard with only a single section of road closure, and
no damaged infrastructure like downed power lines, the EOC will be activated to include the participants
of the initial conference call with some DEM staff as well - usually about 12 people at that point. For a
major winter event that hits the entire state with more serious impacts like stranded motorists and
power outages, a full EOC activation might also include the SD Department of Health, the SD National
Guard, and others. Therefore, the level of activation builds dynamically as the emergency builds.
SDDOT does not have documentation of the specific personnel included at each level of activation or the
specific procedures for each level of activation. However, at the beginning of every winter, all agencies
meet and go over what went well last season and anything that has changed to prepare for the coming
winter. These meetings also familiarize staff with the group of personnel that will be coordinating
emergencies for the coming winter.
Is there any documentation to show that the Highway Patrol understands its role relative to the DOT
during winter storm emergencies? Do they sign off on the plan?
SDHP does not formally review or sign-off on the plan, because they likely have their own internal
document that they use to define their role in a winter emergency. Any specific coordination required
would come up in the pre-season meeting. For example, SDDOT has a specific procedure for how to
consider closing an interstate. Neither SDDOT nor SDHP can do it independently, SDDOT has to control
the gates and SDHP sweeps the closed section to make sure no one is “trapped” within the closure.
Following the pre-season meeting, plans are updated, if necessary, with information gleaned from the
meeting. So that is how SDHP is kept “in the loop” with the SDDOT’s plans and procedures.
Are there any documented agreements with other states about sharing RSIC resources during an
emergency?
SDDOT has not had the need to call on out-of-state resources for help during a winter storm in recent
memory. The worst storm in recent memory was in 1996-1997, when the National Guard had to be
activated and brought some of its equipment to assist SDDOT in maintaining the public roads. Most of
the time when SDDOT gets hit with a bad storm that is severe enough to warrant help from adjacent
states, those states have been hit too, so resource-sharing is not practical.
South Dakota seems to treat the escalation of the resource implementation and shifting as a normal
course of events, with the flexibility to adapt a variety of storm intensities. Does resource-shifting
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between regions within South Dakota happen every winter? Has personnel-shifting been seamless
from a human-resources administrative standpoint?
As recently as last year South Dakota had a winter storm hit the northwest part of the state and
equipment from the southeastern part of the state was moved up to help. It might only be a couple of
people or trucks, but it is pretty routine in South Dakota.
SDDOT evaluates every storm independently, and will move resources if the storm is only going to affect
a specific portion of the state. However, if the forecast is not precise, it might be too risky to move
equipment. SDDOT has the resources in each region to provide normal RSIC during routine events, but
often need to move large or specialized equipment like snow blowers to where they are needed most.
SDDOT has travel policies for staff so it is easy to shift them to a different location temporarily. The travel
policies cover hotel stays, per diem, etc. Staff that are shifted report directly to the region they traveled
to, so there is no need to have communications between supervisors. Time sheet codes track what routes
were served, the equipment used, and how much time was spent, so it is a seamless process.
Have any After Action reviews been conducted after a major winter storm emergency, or are any
training exercises routinely conducted to prepare for one?
In the annual pre-season meeting, lessons learned from the previous winter season are discussed as well
as changes or improvements that can be made to the plans. There are also local meetings in each Area,
which include local SDHP staff and local maintenance engineers to assess how things went last year.
These local meetings often include local sheriffs, city police, and emergency responders as well.
Has SDDOT considered incorporating the information in the SDOEM’s Winter Storm Risk Assessment
(from the 2016 State Hazard Identification Risk Assessment) into this plan? Or contributing the
information in its plan to the SDOEM for description of SDDOT’s role in response during emergency
winter storms?
SDDOT has reviewed the information in SDOEM’s Winter Storm Risk Assessment to make sure there is
nothing to include in SDDOT’s plan. In addition, all SDDOT staff have been trained in the Incident
Command System, which familiarizes them with SDOEM’s procedures. Within the ICS framework, SDDOT
understands our specifically prescribed roles and reports to the EOC, which is located at SDOEM.
Therefore, once the EOC is activated, SDDOT and SDOEM are fully integrated.
3.1.2 Case Study
3.1.2.1 Define the Issue
South Dakota is the first state in this study that includes its emergency procedures for winter storms
within its plan for normal snow and ice control operations. What is the issue or event that prompted
the development of the plan? How long have emergency procedures been a part of the snow and ice
control plan?
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The emergency procedures that are described in the plan have been established since at least as far back
as 2010. Prior to 2010, SDDOT had a stand-alone document for emergency management and a standalone document for winter maintenance. We found that during a major event, our staff were familiar
with the winter maintenance plan but the emergency procedures were not as widely circulated. So it was
decided to combine them into one document so staff can get all of the necessary information in one
place.
3.1.2.2 Describe the Background
What is the history of your agency’s activity in this area? How have winter weather emergencies been
handled in the past?
Public communication has been extremely important for SDDOT, and our successes in handling some of
the most severe winter weather storms can be attributed to it. Whenever we know a major winter storm
is coming, we let the public know there will be a potential for closures, and we remind them that we have
“hours of operation” that are generally from 5am to 7pm. After 7pm, we remind them that driving
conditions may be poor, so they should adjust their travel schedules accordingly. By managing the
expectations of the driver, we help them make better decisions and they become more tolerant of our
operations. Road closures and recommended speed limits are an important way for us to communicate
to drivers and change their expectations.
3.1.2.3 Generate Alternatives/Describe the Proposed Solution
What are some of the things that your agency can do better? What tools/resources do you need?
SD is the lead state for a maintenance decision support system (MDSS) pooled-fund study. In that project,
we are working with a vendor to get a 48-hour modeled forecast. MDSS is a product provided by Iteris,
Inc. that uses sensors and data gathered from the automatic vehicle location (AVL) in our trucks,
combines it with RWIS and other weather data, and makes a recommendation for maintenance
supervisors for the coming 24 hours. The idea is to use the recommendation to help inform better
decision-making by supervisors. Based on the action our supervisor then takes, the tool incorporates the
action taken into the recommendation next time, so the recommendations get smarter. SDDOT is also
doing a study to assess whether we should completely build out our AVL connectivity to the entire fleet.
Right now only 35% of the fleet has AVL. That study will be completed in March.
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3.2 COLORADO CASE STUDY
Kerry Kimble, the Planning Section Chief from the Colorado
Department of Transportation - Office of Emergency
Management, responded to the initial survey for this project
(see sidebar). His response prompted the review of three
separate written DOT documents pertaining to emergencyresponse to extreme winter weather, as well as the statewide
all-hazard EOP.
Kerry Kimble participated in a follow-up conference call on
November 9, 2017. The results of this interview are presented
below, with questions in bold and answers in italics.
3.2.1 Follow-Up to Survey Responses: Additional
Details
It looks like CDOT refrains from specifying exact snowfall
amounts or intensities to trigger emergency procedures. Is
that intentional? In Appendix 1 of the Winter Operations’
Conference Call SOP, it looks like the number of Sections
affected is a key measure to initiate the call. Is that a key
measure of the likelihood of needing to initiate emergency
procedures?
Initiation of an emergency is part of the conference call, and the
measure of severity is roughly the spread of the event, or the
number of Sections (regions) being affected.
It looks like the Winter Operations’ Conference Call would
cover communication of CDOT with NWS, then the WebEOC
opens up communication with other state agencies. Or is
WebEOC only designed to facilitate communication within
CDOT? What is the relationship between the Conference Call
and WebEOC?
When CDOT posts to WebEOC, other state and local agencies
can see the post, and we can see their posts. But there is no
dialogue on WebEOC - the dialogue occurs in the conference
call. For example, shifting of resources between sections would
be covered in the conference call. For bigger events, when the
state EOC is being activated, the Colorado DEM will initiate
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COLORADO SURVEY RESULTS
What are the "trigger criteria" for
implementing the response plan?
Anticipated / current weather conditions
Does the plan include specific rules for
communication between
jurisdictions/agencies to facilitate the
response? No
Are the roles of each jurisdiction/agency
clearly defined? No
Are any documented memoranda of
understanding between agencies
available? Yes
Does the plan cover communication
between snow and ice control managers
and emergency responders? Yes
Does the plan call for an agency
representative to staff or report to local
jurisdiction emergency operations
centers? Yes
Does the plan specifically address lifesafety measures necessary for stranded
travelers and/or vulnerable residents?
Yes
How are resources demobilized after the
event is over and the response has been
completed? The event coordinator
(incident commander) determines need
availability. Those no longer needed are
returned to their home unit.
Documented time and activities are
through an internal DOT tracking
software program.
Are processes (either formal or informal)
in place to review emergency-response
performance after completion of
emergency operations? Yes
Are processes (either formal or informal)
in place to collect data to support FEMA
disaster declaration and reimbursement
requirements? Yes

their own conference call, with a CDOT OEM representative in attendance.
Does CDOT expect its snow and ice control resources to be overwhelmed at any time, such that
EMACs would be useful? Has help been sought from other states in the past?
We have agreements with Wyoming, Nebraska, and Kansas for emergency support, but the only time
we’ve asked for assistance was for the 2013 flood, never for winter storm issues. Resources are moved at
the maintenance section level, even for normal personnel leave issues, not only for storm impact issues.
What types of training or after-action review does CDOT conduct for winter storm emergencies? How
frequently?
CDOT does not have a written plan for the after-action reviews. We have meetings and conversations
that are dedicated to reviewing our performance, but nothing specifically documented. For example,
about 18 months ago CDOT and Colorado State Patrol (CSP) met to informally discuss regional handling
of traffic impacts from winter storms at a particular location where this is a continuing problem.
3.2.2 Case Study
Define the Issue / Describe the Background
What is the issue or event that prompted the development of the plan? How did CDOT come to have
an Office of Emergency Management? Other states see that effort led by the emergency management
agency. What is the history of your agency’s activity in this area? How have winter weather
emergencies been handled in the past?
In September 2013 Colorado experienced a 24-County flood which impacted 200 miles of highways and
damaged infrastructure. That event led to the creation of an OEM at CDOT, which started with 1 person
and grew to 4, where it stands currently. Three (3) of the OEM staff came over from the Colorado DEM,
which has helped improve coordination between CDOT and CDHSEM. CDOT OEM reports directly to the
Deputy Director of the Agency, so they are on the same level as the Division of Highway Maintenance.
We are also physically in the same building, same floor as the Division of Highway Maintenance, so that
facilitates communication extensively.
Generate Alternatives
What are some of the things that your agency can do better? What tools/resources do you need?
On a daily basis, we receive information from 4 different NWS stations through a daily weather
PowerPoint. When we convene a conference call to discuss a pending storm, the PowerPoint is updated
specifically for the call. We probably have 4-5 major winter storms per year that require a conference
call.
Describe the Proposed Solution
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Has CDOT considered a specific plan for reducing/focusing
the scope of RSIC to the most critical routes/facilities? Is
some of this covered in the Winter Operations Maintenance
Plan?
No, CDOT has not considered that sort of reduction. The only
time something like that might have been considered was in
2006-2007, when Colorado had two blizzards back to back, and
Stafford Act (Presidential) declarations resulted for both. The
Winter Operations Maintenance Plan is not likely to have that
information.
3.3 PENNSYLVANIA CASE STUDY
Jon Fleming, the Division Chief from the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation, responded to the initial survey
for this project (see sidebar). His response prompted the
review of Chapter 9: Emergency-Response of the DOT’s
Maintenance Manual (PennDOT, 2015), which describes DOT
response duties to all severe weather events.
Jon Fleming and Dan Whetzel, PennDOT Maintenance
Manager, participated in a follow-up interview on November
8, 2017. The results of this interview are presented below,
with questions in bold and answers in italics.
3.3.1 Follow-Up to Survey Responses: Additional
Details
What is the relationship between the Publication 23 and the
All-Hazards Incident Management Manual – Publication No.
911 and its sister document, Publication 911B?
These documents contain only high-level operating guidelines,
not specific procedures. Our emergency operations are not
checklist-oriented because too many emergency situations
require managers to be reactive to what the specific situation
calls for. Field foremen and field assistants might make use of
a checklist at times, but for the most part they are reacting in a
way that we have taught them to react within the concepts
laid out in the ICS 300 training. We have PennDOT personnel
teach the ICS training so the teacher speaks the language of
PennDOT.
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PENNSYLVANIA SURVEY
RESULTS

What are the "trigger criteria" for
implementing the response plan (as
opposed to treating the weather event
as a routine operation)? Severity of the
event - our plan starts prior to a
Governor's Declaration
Does the plan include specific rules for
communication between
jurisdictions/agencies to facilitate the
response? Yes
Are the roles of each jurisdiction/agency
clearly defined? Yes
Are any documented memoranda of
understanding between agencies
available? No
Does the plan cover communication
between snow and ice control managers
and emergency responders (e.g. police,
fire and rescue and regional emergency
managers)? Yes
Does the plan call for an agency
representative to staff or report to local
jurisdiction emergency operations
centers? Yes
Does the plan specifically address lifesafety measures necessary for stranded
travelers and/or vulnerable residents?
Yes
Are processes (either formal or informal)
in place to review emergency-response
performance after completion of
emergency operations? Yes
Are processes (either formal or informal)
in place to collect data to support FEMA
disaster declaration and reimbursement
requirements? Yes
Are there Agencies that you know of
that have emergency response plans for
extreme winter events? Our Emergency
Management Agency

Ultimately, PennDOT’s job is to divert traffic during an incident, not to respond to the incident
specifically. Occasionally we have road damage to attend to, but we are ultimately at the “back” of the
incident, operating in the background.
Are there any specific trigger criteria for an emergency winter event? Who makes the call?
We have very broad guidelines describing the triggers for an emergency event. The call is made by either
the Division Chief, the Deputy Secretary or the Bureau Director. We also have 6 personnel trained to be
area commanders, who have the authority to lower the speed limit if the situation warrants. These speed
limit reductions are not enforceable, they are guidelines communicated on the variable message boards.
We try to be overprotective in issuing speed limit reduction guidelines in an effort to slow the traffic
down.
Is Appendix D the rules for communication during emergency winter storm events? Are specific
contacts and contact info provided anywhere?
We have a pre-event weather WebEx before any forecasted severe weather event – flood, snow,
tornado, etc.. The engineering districts, county reps, the administration, Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA), state police, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and our contract forecaster
(AccuWeather) are on the call to discuss the response, and the call follows a script. This happens anytime
we expect to have snowfall across 2 or 3 of our geographic areas. Last year, as an example, even though
it was a moderate winter for adverse weather, we had 5 or 6 WebEx conferences. The WebEx is where
we decide if we will activate our area command. If we do, the affected districts activate their district
command centers and a 2-hour reporting interval is initiated. So all parties are checking-in every 2 hours,
we are no longer in routine operating mode. The WebEx is also where we discuss moving resources
within the state to the regions expected to be impacted more significantly. These practices are not
documented in detail anywhere - we follow only a rough set of guidelines for incident management.
It looks like PennDOT has been a leader amongst the state agencies in the All-Hazards Planning area.
Most other states see that effort led by the emergency management agency. How did PennDOT
become the lead agency in all-hazard planning? Has anything been done to ensure that the other
agencies shown in the “PennDOT Incident Communication Process” buy-in to this plan? Does PEMA
have their own plans that pertain to emergency winter storm events? Are they coordinated with
PennDOT’s?
PEMA is similar to other OEMs in that they are closely tied to the governor’s term. So with each new
governor’s term, the rules for how PEMA operates are rewritten because there is a new administration.
So PEMA normally assumes the role of a facilitator, so they can authorize ESF 1 (PennDOT) to take
whatever actions necessary during an emergency. Being a Commonwealth, all of Pennsylvania’s E911
centers answer to a County-level government, which doesn’t necessarily have to answer to the state. As
a Commonwealth, we try to govern at the most local level. For transportation purposes, that falls to the
County level. So its good that PEMA doesn’t dictate specific actions too strongly, but it puts a lot of
responsibility on PennDOT’s shoulders.
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Because PennDOT is not a first responder, our PEMA gets the initial call from our County-level 911
centers. Sometimes PEMA hears about the incident before PennDOT. So PennDOT needs a clear line of
communication with PEMA. The importance of this communication might come about if a localized
incident requires local PennDOT resources but the “push” for that response needs to come from a central
PennDOT division. During significant incidents, PennDOT and PEMA co-locate at the statewide traffic
management center, which is embedded within the statewide EOC “watch” center. So PEMA, although
they don’t make decisions for PennDOT, are the first line of communication with PennDOT.
Can PennDOT provide a copy of the After Action Review Agenda?
Publication 911B has been an internal document, it’s very large and includes detailed information about
our global detours and other things we would not want to release to the public. [Follow-up request for
the After Action Review Agenda was successful.]
3.3.2 Case Study
Define the Issue / Describe the Background
What is the issue or event that prompted the development of the plan? How did PennDOT become
the lead agency in all-hazard planning? Most other states see that effort led by the emergency
management agency. What is the history of your agency’s activity in this area? How have winter
weather emergencies been handled in the past?
Before 2007, the ICS did not exist at PennDOT. This type of response planning was very decentralized
before then. In 2007, Pennsylvania had a major snow storm that took out 6 interstates and stranded
motorists for up to 2 days. During the review of the response to that incident, a lot of the response
planning was initiated, and the position of Section Chief was created. After that, PennDOT started
changing some of its procedures, especially through the initiation of ICS 300 and 400 training. This year,
we have grown to the point where we are hiring new staff in our department.
We had enough snow last year to get a Presidential declaration – $19 million of damage over 5 counties
and 30 inches of snow in Harrisburg. New York State shut their roads to commercial vehicles, so
Pennsylvania had to initiate similar restrictions, with an effective pre-storm communication to
commercial trucking companies, including alternate routing suggestions to counties that were not
expected to be hit as hard. We considered our response a success because we didn’t need to do any full
closures, just one interstate closure for less than 2 hours.
Generate Alternatives
What are some of the things that your agency can do better? What tools/resources do you need?
The 511PAConnects is a tool we got recently, it allows us to “break into” motorists’ cell phones to provide
information about traffic disruptions that they may be experiencing. The speed limit management
decision tree has also been a huge improvement that has helped us, and personnel at PennDOT really like
it.
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[511PAConnect is a trapped-traveler emergency communications tool that allows incident response
teams to communicate via automated phone or text message directly with motorists who are trapped in
a roadway backup. The tool also gives emergency crews a clearer picture of who is sitting in a trapped
vehicle and where they are, so agencies can better plan for the use of resources. 511PAConnect is not a
mobile app and requires no initial download or action from motorists. 511PAConnect is only activated
during prolonged, emergency roadway stoppages that are expected to last four or more hours. Upon
activation, PEMA will send a push message to all phones in the incident area. This message will provide
motorists who are impacted instructions for how to participate and receive further information
throughout the incident.]
Describe the Proposed Solution
Can we get a copy of the speed-limit management decision
tree? Can we get a copy of Publication 911B?
[Follow-up request for the speed-limit management decision
tree was successful.]
3.4 GEORGIA CASE STUDY

THE GEORGIA EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS PLAN

The Georgia DOT response is triggered
based on National Weather Service
outlooks, advisories, and warnings with
a tiered activation process that depends
on the time until the storm is projected
to arrive.

Since Georgia did not complete the initial survey, the Georgia
EOP was identified during an open search of the literature on
this topic. The EOP includes a winter-weather incident annex
that provides an overview of how the state coordinates
response to significant winter-weather incidents (GEMA/HS,
2016).

The plan includes:

Review of this Annex was used to document the basics of
GDOT emergency response planning (see sidebar). After an
exhaustive search for an individual at GDOT who is most
familiar with the plan, a follow-up interview was held with
Bryan Haines, the State Emergency Operations Administrator
for the Georgia Department of Transportation, on October
30, 2017. The results of this interview are presented below,
with questions in bold and answers in italics.

• Rules for communication between
jurisdictions/agencies to facilitate the
response including communication
between snow and ice control managers
and emergency responders

3.4.1 Follow-Up to Survey Responses: Additional
Details
The GDOT Winter Weather Procedures dictate staffing the
EOC at a Level 1 or Level 2 storm (or, presumably, a Level 3
storm). Is this consistent with the triggers in the Georgia
EOP? The Hazard Mitigation Strategy seems to imply that
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• Trigger criteria for implementing a
response, based on operational
conditions (OPCON) 1 thru 4
• Clearly defined roles for
jurisdictions/agencies, including GDOT

• An agency representative to local
jurisdiction emergency operations
centers
• Preparatory actions such as shifting
resources between service-areas
• Life-safety measures necessary for
stranded travelers and/or vulnerable
residents through a multi-agency “strike
team” structure
• Demobilization procedures after the
event is over and the response has been
completed

every winter weather event is treated as severe winter weather, documenting an average of 65 per
year since 1940.
Since 2014 (and our emergency winter storm), our state agencies have come together statewide better
than ever before through our statewide EOC. Once GEMA/HS activates the EOC, all of the agencies are
making decisions collaboratively. GDOT is the lead on most of the decisions related to winter storms, and
a critical decision is whether to start the brine operation. We have been quicker to make that decision
since 2014, and we make it 24-30 hours before the expected impact. For example, we might have 30%
confidence that the storm is going to hit, and it might be forecasted to start with rain. We have to be
pro-active in that situation with the brine operation because it puts us in control before the storm starts.
So we often enter into the brine operation even before the EOC is activated. Especially in the Atlanta
area, we are going to be on the conservative side with our response to winter storms.
What steps are taken to ensure “buy-in” from all of the agencies mentioned in the plan? Any
memoranda of understanding? Do you think the GEMA/HS buys into the GDOT Winter Weather
Procedures, and does GDOT buy into the Winter Weather Incident Annex? Was GDOT involved with
the developed of the Hazard Mitigation Strategy in 2014?
Since 2014, GEMA/HS has been better about holding exercises for the year, like the mid-November
winter weather exercise, where we go through the exercise, explaining different aspects of our response.
This exercise is better than any paper document because we have to show up, we have to communicate,
and we have to acknowledge our roles, in addition to getting practice at actually doing it. So we get buyin from our various agencies through these types of real-life interactions several times a year, and this
supersedes the need to have signature pages or documented approvals.
Is the multi-agency “strike team” (Appendix E) solely providing brine and salt truck escort? It seems
designed for more than that, as shown on Page 8.
We added the brine operation in Georgia after 2014. The strike teams are not a convoy – they are shown
that way in the figure only on page 8. They operate along a given section of interstate, each providing
the necessary service they are intended for where its needed most. They remain in close radio
communication during their response. The Georgia State Police (GSP) escort is there solely as an escort
for public safety, and it also helps with the efficiency of the operation. We acknowledge that it’s a big
request for the GSP escort, because they are also short of resources at a time like this. However,
especially in a metro area like Atlanta, if we are out there 24 hours before the event and its 60 degrees
and we are brining, the traffic is heavy and drivers don’t tend to yield without a GSP escort forcing it. The
escort also ensures that the drivers will leave the right amount of safe space around the brining vehicle.
The strike teams are critical for winter storms and hurricanes for keeping traffic flowing and responding
to any situation that might arise to restrict traffic flow or endanger motorists.
Is the plan reviewed and edited on a regular basis, especially with lessons learned following an
extreme winter weather event?
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We are pro-active in trying to enhance our current plan and increase our capabilities. We are constantly
trying to increase our fleet for plowing and brining, but that can be difficult when we go a year or two
without a significant winter storm. Especially in parts of the state that do not get significant winter
storms every year, the case for using resources to be prepared is more difficult to make.
3.4.2 Case Study
Define the Issue
What is the issue or event that prompted the development of the plan?
The 2014 event had a significant influence on our attention to planning. At GDOT, we had been working
on the All-Hazards Plan for years. We normally manage our response to emergencies at the more local
level, but we were finding that we had to be working toward planning at the statewide level as well,
especially as it related to using our resources most wisely – shifting them from places where they were
not needed to places where they were needed most. Even so, anytime you experience an event like a
hurricane or a snow storm, it serves as a catalyst for enhancing resources for planning. After 2014, the
Governor made some decisions that accelerated the planning processes for emergencies.
At other agencies in Georgia, it has prompted some changes as well. After 2014, GEMA hired a full-time
meteorologist and the NWS in Atlanta was pulled in to work more closely with the state, offering more
impact-oriented forecasts instead of simple weather forecasts. GDOT has added 25 more RWIS stations
across the state in response to 2014, and engaged in more nationwide data-sharing programs.
Describe the Background
What is the history of your agency’s activity in this area? How have winter weather emergencies been
handled in the past?
Prior to 2014, our approach was really agency-specific response planning. After the winter storm in 2014,
the approach became more focused on state-response planning, including all agencies cooperatively
with GEMA acting as the “holder” of our plans, not allowing them to accumulate dust. Having that one
agency dedicated to keeping the plans fresh and working with the ESF leads to keep the personnel
trained is critical. Its becoming clearer every year to our governing administration that having full-time
people in positions like the State Emergency Operations Administrator at each state agency is critical.
The November meeting every year is also a great exercise for keeping things fresh and updated.
Generate Alternatives
What are some of the things that your agency can do better? What tools/resources do you need?
Does RITIS help?
GDOT is trying to bring in a more statewide-level of planning to supplement the current regional
procedures. We had some weaknesses in our winter storm plan in the past. We often need to bring
resources to Atlanta to help fight problematic winter storms. Prior to 2014, though, personnel that we
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moved were not always given high-level guidance on their mission. So their work is very reactionary –
they wake up in a strange location, get specific instructions, get to work, but then might have those
instructions changed an hour later – a very reactionary process. We restructured the way we respond,
especially in and around Atlanta, to be more mission-oriented. We now have a process where we can
shift resources from the coastal areas down to Atlanta if they are needed, and then give those personnel
a specific mission, even down to a segment of interstate that they are fully responsible for.
Describe the Proposed Solution
What is HERO? MCCD? GFC?
Highway Emergency Response Operators (HERO) is GDOT’s highway response unit for metro Atlanta – a
multi-purpose vehicle that can service a flat tire, refill gas for a motorist that has run out of gas, tow a
stalled vehicle, clear the highway of debris, etc..
GFC is Georgia Forestry Commission – they are on the team for control and clearing of vegetative debris,
which is a frequent problem during winter storms in Georgia, particularly storms that feature heavy
icing.
MCCD is the Motor Carrier Compliance Division, which is part of the Georgia Department of Public
Safety, and handles heavy truck weight/permitting enforcement.
The GEMA/HS plan only seems to specifically cover the interstates. The Winter Weather Procedures
describe the priorities for other highways and streets? Are the interstates the only priority that
GEMA/HS is concerned about?
Most states focus on the interstates in emergencies, and they are the #1 priority in Georgia as well. We
try to follow the traffic volume in prioritizing highways to focus on, and volume tends to follow the
interstates. In fact, in the past if we had our focus on the interstates and got a call that there was trouble
on a smaller multi-lane highway, we would shift our focus to that route. However, we view it now as a
mission, so when you pull resources from a mission, you are aborting the mission. In this case, you are
going to compromise the interstate and therefore compromise the entire plan, upon which the mission is
based. So we try to stick to the mission that’s in the plan, so that the more local entities can rely on
GDOT’s role to be focused on the interstates.
Has vegetative debris been a problem on state highways and interstates during severe winter
weather? Is there any specification for Multi-Agency Debris Removal Task Forces?
We have a lot of pine trees in Georgia – they snap and break easily during winter storms, blocking roads.
GDOT can clear downed trees from the road, but its inefficient for us to be stopping our brining operation
to handle vegetative debris. So if GDOT encounters a downed tree or debris, we call that Debris Removal
task force to respond so we don’t have to stop brining.

27

The plan states that the highest probability of winter
storms occurs in February, but the highest historical
incidence documented by the HMS document is in
January since 1940. Has an intensive analysis of
historical storms been conducted?
No, an intensive analysis has not been conducted.
September and October are the big planning months for
the winter season. Then January and February are
considered the high-risk months, but we are concerned
about the other winter months too.
3.5 NEW YORK CASE STUDY
Mike Lashmet, the Snow and Ice Program Engineer for
the New York State Department of Transportation,
responded to the initial survey for this project (see
sidebar). His response prompted the review of the
NYSDOT Emergency Transportation Operations Playbook
(NYSDOT, 2016), which governs NYSDOT response to
severe winter weather emergencies, as well as the New
York State Hazard Mitigation Plan, which provides an
extensive summary of historical storm events.
Mike Lashmet, Joe Thompson (Assistant Program
Engineer for Snow and Ice), Rita Carlson (Emergency
Transportation Operations Director), Matt Vasilow
(Assistant Emergency Transportation Operations
Director), and Jennifer Hawkins (Acting Bureau Director)
participated in a follow-up interview on November 27,
2017. The results of this interview are presented below,
with questions in bold and answers in italics.
3.5.1 Follow-Up to Survey Responses:
Additional Details
How is communication with the specific agencies on
page 2-8 conducted? Do other agencies look at SEERT?
Does information go from the DOT to NYResponds, or is
SEERT linked to NYResponds?
No other agencies can see SEERT, only NYSDOT. The AVL
feed on our truck locations can be seen by the Thruway
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NEW YORK SURVEY RESULTS
What are the "trigger criteria" for implementing
the response plan? Governor's Declaration, DOT
Management, and Local Declaration
Does the plan include specific rules for
communication between jurisdictions/agencies
to facilitate the response? Yes
Are any documented memoranda of
understanding between agencies available? Yes
Does the plan cover communication between
snow and ice control managers and emergency
responders? Yes
Does the plan call for an agency representative
to staff or report to local jurisdiction emergency
operations centers? Yes
Does the plan specifically address life-safety
measures necessary for stranded travelers
and/or vulnerable residents? No
How are resources demobilized after the event
is over and the response has been completed?
All deployed personnel and equipment are
tracked through an in-house system. As
missions are completed, crews are usually
demobilized intact as initially deployed. Crews
generally remain overnight to rest up before
traveling back to home base. Equipment is all
checked out and serviced before the return trip.
The in-house system then tracks the departure
date and time of each individual and then
records arrival date and time back to home
base, to be sure all personnel are accounted for.
Equipment is rechecked soon after arrival at
home base.
Are processes (either formal or informal) in
place to review emergency-response
performance after completion of emergency
operations? Yes
Are processes (either formal or informal) in
place to collect data to support FEMA disaster
declaration and reimbursement requirements?
Yes

Authority through an ArcGIS SnowCOP (Snow Common Operational Picture) viewer. NYResponds is
where requests will come in to a common location from Counties and towns when they are
overwhelmed, and those requests are routed to the appropriate ESF, in our case ESF 1. NYResponds is
where the agencies all get to see a common picture. There are different access levels in NYResponds,
though, it is a “rebranded” form of DLAN. So if a state agency needs help during an emergency, they
generally support each other and they may go through this system, depending on the situation. Only
locations of the trucks and the locations of the requests are geocoded in NYResponds – it’s a completely
different system from SEERT. We are developing a Winter Operations APP to serve as a central viewer for
live data but that is not completed yet.
In the last few months, NYS developed a disaster-preparedness asset tracker, which tracks NYSDOT
assets and other state agency assets (beyond the Thruway and NYSDOT) that can be deployed in any
type of emergency. Most of the state’s assets are NYSDOT assets but others are there too. The tracker is
an app on a tablet that includes all of the information on the asset – photo, location, description.
Do the agencies listed on page 2-8 sign off on this plan?
We have frequent meetings with the other agencies listed, they have a copy of the Playbook, but there
are not any signature pages or memoranda of understanding (MOUs) attesting to their understanding of
their roles. Their comments and feedback were not solicited before the 2016 update.
How does NYSDOT communicate with state and local police during a winter emergency? Is it
important for NYSDOT to be aware of, and responsive to, life-safety situations during emergency
winter storms? Life-safety efforts include state police and emergency-responders’ efforts to rescue
stranded motorists and residents statewide, while continuing to provide normal police, fire, and
ambulance response activities.
We work with state police frequently on closures. If we are considering closing a road, the state police,
the NYSDOT Commissioner, OEM, and the Governor’s Office are all involved. Sometimes that process
might play out on the local level before the information never gets up to NYResponds, but in the case of
major winter storm where we might have stranded motorists, that decision will be elevated to the level
where all agencies are involved and coordinated through NYResponds so there is not only a closure but a
response within the closure. NYSDOT is not typically involved in rescue or specific response within a
closure, although we might be involved on the ground when it comes to instituting something like a
tractor-trailer ban.
The Playbook contains good information about After Action reviews, but is there also a regular
(annual or biennial) meeting to discuss lessons learned, preparations, and/or modify the plan?
The regions have snow and ice kickoff meetings every year, led by the regional engineers. The Fall
meeting includes a discussion about operational safety for the changeover of equipment from summer
work to winter work. Issues pertaining to snow and ice maintenance and operations are also discussed.
Those meetings occur at the more granular level. At the system level, there is continuous training and
drilling so there is no need for an annual meeting. We do at least one statewide drill per year and regions
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can do their individual drills as well – those are coordinated through the regional emergency
management offices. NYResponds always contains active events, so it’s a tool that is active and used
continuously.
3.5.2 Case Study
Define the Issue
NYSDOT’s plan seems to be at leading edge of the practice. Was there an issue or event that
prompted the development of the plan?
The playbook was originally put together in 2015. Prior to that, we had our plan for how to deploy
resources, we made phone calls, but we never had anything officially documented. Our Commissioner
got the ball rolling to make sure that everything was documented. An important result of this process of
documenting the procedures is that it will survive changes in senior leadership.
Describe the Background
What is the history of your agency’s activity in this area? How have winter weather emergencies been
handled in the past?
We have improved our ability to account for our assets. In the past, we had a more ad hoc way of
tracking resources – consisting of things like passing around Excel spreadsheets. One of the big recent
improvements was to automate that process, using the SEERT tool, and using AVL which is provided by
Verizon. This allows us to see the dynamic status of our emergency equipment. For snow and ice, we
have a storm operations status that is updated manually every 2-8 hours during a storm.
Generate Alternatives
What are some of the things that your agency can do better? What tools/resources do you need?
Our After Action Reviews pertaining to winter weather have concluded that getting early and frequent
communication and messaging out to the public before a storm is most effective for reducing impacts.
The messaging typically pertains to restrictions that will be in place, and that travel is discouraged during
certain times. We can improve our planning for how we close specific road segments, especially where
ramps are included. We can also coordinate better with other states where closures or restrictions might
impact their traffic.
Describe the Proposed Solution
Is Appendix I finalized yet?
The different types and rates of precipitation that appear in Appendix I were just a place to start for us to
begin considering risk and impacts from different storm intensities. Since these are just “guidelines” and
they use ranges of intensity, we did not want to call it “final” and tie our hands when it comes to being
flexible regionally. NWS has better risk levels that correspond to different intensities, but are sensitive to

30

different regions in the state – 2 inches an hour upstate will not have as adverse an impact as that same
rate of snowfall on Long Island.
Can you explain the Critical Response Segments in Appendix J?
They pertain to the priority “beats” for maintenance during emergency winter storms – they are not the
same beats we use for normal snow and ice maintenance. We use these beats as a reference for
determining whether we will need to move resources in order to prioritize maintenance. “Residences” are
the DOT shops, which generally have responsibility for the County where they are located. Priority A
beats are system-critical locations in red, blue are municipal responsibility, and the rest are green.
Priority A roads were determined by senior leadership in the region to be system-critical, so the focus is
to decrease the cycle times on those highways if you are receiving supplemental resources. Priority B
roads come into play if a Priority A road is closed, then the Priority B road becomes system-critical.
Can you explain the “1/3 Fleet” concept for resource-shifting?
It is the level to which equipment and staff from one location can be reduced if they are needed
elsewhere, or to compensate for an extraordinary situation such as flu or pandemic, allowing for a
minimum acceptable level of service – essentially creating a “bullpen” for each shop. Most of the time,
for winter storms, assets are being shared from upstate to downstate to create a smaller cycle time, so
this is the level that we do not let those upstate shops fall below.
3.6 MICHIGAN CASE STUDY
Since Michigan did not complete the initial survey, the
Michigan Emergency Management Plan (MEMP)
(MSP/EMHSD, 2016) and the Michigan Hazard Mitigation
Plan (MHMP) (MSP/EMHSD, 2014) were identified during an
open search of the literature on this topic. The MEMP
includes a disaster-specific procedure for severe winter
weather and the MHMP provides risk analysis information
specific to winter weather.
Review of the MEMP was used to document the basics of
MDOT emergency response planning (see sidebar). After an
exhaustive search for an individual at MDOT who is most
familiar with the plans we reviewed, a follow-up interview
was held with Eileen Phifer, Safety and Security
Administrator for the Michigan Department of
Transportation, on November 20, 2017 in order to ask followup questions. The results of this interview are presented in
the two subsections below, with questions in bold and
answers in italics.
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THE MICHIGAN EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT PLAN

The MEMP can be triggered by a FEMA
Declaration, a Governor’s Declaration or
a Local/County Declaration.
The plan includes:
• Specific role for MDOT as lead agency
of the Public Works and Engineering ESF,
concerned with issues pertaining to
incident-related damage and impacts to
critical public facilities and
infrastructure, including the
transportation, communications and
energy distribution networks
• Rules for communication between
jurisdictions/agencies to facilitate the
response
• General processes to review
emergency-response performance after
completion of emergency operations

3.6.1 Follow-Up to Survey Responses: Additional Details
Is any additional information on MDOT’s role in maintaining roads during an extreme winter storm
available, like a plan for normal snow and ice control operations?
Michigan has a number of plans that apply to extreme winter storms, there are multiple levels of
response, and each level gets more detailed. The MEMP is very high-level plan. The MEMP is at the
statewide level, and discusses the protection of life and property. MDOT works closely with MSP, who is
the holder of this document, but the author of the document is all state agencies. All agencies have the
opportunity to comment on all sections of the MEMP, even the sections that don’t apply to their role as
an ESF. The state also has a very specific business continuity plan (BCP), which relates to the continued
function of the state agencies during emergencies, to ensure that they keep operating. We also have a
department-wide plan within the BCP, which discusses the mission-essential functions of MDOT,
including snow and ice control.
Most of the specifics regarding snow and ice control are in MDOT’s plan for normal snow and ice control
operations, which is held by Maintenance Services. We look at snow and ice control as a subset of debris
removal in general. [Follow-up requests for MDOT’s snow and ice control plan were successful.]
The plan contains information about petitioning FEMA for a major disaster (not an emergency)
declaration, but these determinations pertain to assessments made during or after the storm,
according to, for example, snowfall totals. What are the procedures used to determine if an
emergency exists and the EOC should be activated? At what point are MDOT staff called on to interact
with, or report to, a local or state EOC?
There is a very prescriptive way to reach EOC activation. Severe weather events start at the local level,
affecting local roads. If a local entity is having trouble with maintenance of its roads in a winter storm,
MDOT will work with the local road commission and MSP/EMHSD. Some road commissions are under a
County umbrella, so the County entity might also be involved. Most of our Counties have a pre-existing
contract with MDOT to work on their roads since they are not normally MDOT’s responsibility. Once they
notify us that their resources are being overwhelmed, we will have them notify their local emergency
management coordinator, who then brings it up to the district emergency management coordinator,
who then brings it up to the state level – the MSP/EMHSD are notified. At that time, either the EOC
would be opened or a virtual activation would be initiated.
After-action reporting is mentioned on page 11, but very few details are provided for the after action
review. Are these details, or a framework for after-action reviews, provided elsewhere?
A couple of years ago, a snow squall created a 100+ car pileup including chemical spills and fireworks on
a major highway from Detroit to Chicago. A very busy section of highway had to be closed for 48 hours. It
didn’t escalate to a Governor’s declaration because it was fairly localized. Costs had to be recovered for
all of the different response entities. After it was cleared and the road re-opened, a contractor was hired
to do an after-action review of all response activities, due to the costs of the incident. [Follow-up
requests for the contractor report on this after-action review were unsuccessful.]
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3.6.2 Case Study
Define the Issue
What is the issue or event that prompted the development of the plan?
In 2004, there was a FEMA-level emergency for a snow storm. Approximately every 3-4 years there is a
major winter storm. Other storms have been substantial where state offices had to be closed. State
police have more information on the history of major storms and the hazard analysis.
Describe the Background
What is the history of your agency’s activity in this area? How have winter weather emergencies been
handled in the past?
A couple of years ago, a snow squall created a 100+ car pileup including chemical spills and fireworks on
a major highway from Detroit to Chicago. A very busy section of highway had to be closed for 48 hours. It
didn’t escalate to a Governor’s declaration because it was fairly localized. Costs had to be recovered for
all of the different response entities. After it was cleared and the road re-opened, a contractor was hired
to do an after-action review of all response activities, due to the costs of the incident.
Generate Alternatives
What are some of the things that your agency can do better? What tools/resources do you need?
We would expect this learning to be happening at the local or regional level, since the local and regional
authorities have more detailed responsibilities.
Describe the Proposed Solution
Reference is made to a “trunkline” system of roadways. Is there a more detailed description of the
“trunkline” system?
The trunkline system is the state-maintained system – interstates, federal highways, and state highways.
We have a set of procedures for closing a trunkline roadway that we developed over several years jointly
with the MSP into a EHTRP and road closure plan, but its not a public document. [Follow-up requests for
the EHTRP were unsuccessful.]
3.7 I-95 CORRIDOR COALITION REVIEW
The I-95 Corridor Coalition is an alliance of transportation agencies, toll authorities, and public safety
agencies, from the State of Maine to the State of Florida that provides a forum for key decision- and
policy-makers to address transportation management and operations issues of common interest. In
order to investigate the potential opportunities offered by this type of collation, a series of questions
were asked via email of Denise Markow, who is the coalition’s Coordinated Incident Management and
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Safety Committee chair. She recommended reviewing the resources available on the I-95 CC’s website
on this topic:
•

•

The I-95 CC worked with seven New England Regional Area States – Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and eastern New York – to hold a
Meteorological Winter Operations Regional Conference on September 24, 2014 in Boston. The
conference goal was to determine a path to better storm management and information
coordination in the New England Regional Area, and brought together the seven states’ Agency
Traffic Operations/Traveler Information and Maintenance personnel responsible for operations
during winter meteorological events.
The I-95 CC held another conference on May 12-13, 2015 in Linthicum, Maryland to share
information on response to all types of “significant events”. Of primary interest for emergency
response planning for extreme winter weather were the materials from the following
presentations at that conference:
o
o
o
o
o

o

“The Multi‐Level Approach,” Denise Markow, Administrator, Bureau of Transportation
Systems Management and Operations, New Hampshire DOT
“Aggressively Making the Call – to Travel or Not to Travel,” John Hibbard, Operations
Division Director, Georgia DOT
“Coordinating Traffic Incident Management Response & Responders,” Jennifer Portanova,
State Systems Engineer, North Carolina DOT
“Responding to Forecasted Significant Events – The Boston Blizzard,” Scott Wilson, Director
of Roadway Operations, Highway Division, Massachusetts DOT
“I-95 Corridor Coalition Regional Integrated Transportation Information System and
Collaborative Decision Tool,” Michael Pack, I-95 Corridor Coalition/Director, University of
Maryland Center for Advanced Transportation Technology
“Truck-Mounted, Remote‐Controlled Video Cameras for Significant Events,” Rick Dye,
Statewide Systems Administrator‐CHART, Maryland State Highway Administration

o
o

“A Snapshot of New York State DOT’s Emergency Response Tools,“ Christine Klein, Regional
Emergency Manager, New York State DOT
“Emergency Management Assistance Compact – The State DOT Perspective,” John
Scrivani, Assistant Division Administrator, Virginia DOT‐Operations Division

Many of the materials contain information of value to states and municipalities in preparing or
enhancing a plan for emergency response to extreme winter weather. Both lessons learned and
expected best practices are covered, and many of these practices were also discussed in the interviews
and case studies documented above.
The role of I-95 CC as an information resource, and as a forum for data sharing amongst its members has
resulted in the creation of the Regional Integrated Transportation Information System (RITIS), which
allows its users to see data from other users’ states or municipalities. Several of the interviewees for this
project make use of the RITIS as a data-sharing resource for winter weather planning already. The
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Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) appeared to be at the forefront of this
type of use of RITIS, but in the survey for this project, our Maryland DOT rep for Clear Roads did not
indicate that Maryland had a formal strategy for dealing with winter weather emergencies. Further
efforts to contact a representative at MWCOG for further clarification were unsuccessful.
Since the I-95 CC’s historical role has been oriented solely toward information- and data-sharing, the
following question was asked:
Has the I-95 CC ever considered facilitating actual cross-jurisdiction agreements for resource-sharing
during extreme weather events? This would mean that the I-95 CC would become more than a forum
for information-sharing, but an actual facilitator, possibly even a holder of signed agreements
between agencies.
We have not done anything like that to date but this coming January [2018] we are facilitating an
exchange between the Southern states and their response strategies to Hurricane Irma - so there may be
an opportunity to develop this type of initiative starting in the South.
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BEST PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter covers the recommendations and best practices distilled from the six interview-based case
studies described in Chapter 3. This set of recommendations is a synthesis of the best practices and
lessons learned that were common to multiple case studies. These best practices provide a framework
for the creation or updating of a written emergency response plan for extreme winter storm events.
Best practices are included if they are widely transferable, meaning that they are useful for any state or
municipality in developing or refining their approach to planning for emergency response to severe
winter weather. Practices or approaches that are specific to certain regions or DOTs and are less
transferable to other agencies are not included as best practices. Recommendations fall into the
following categories:
•
•

Organization & Communication
Planning, Training, and Review

For each category, the recommended best practice is listed, followed by testimony of that practice from
the interviews and the literature review (in italics).
4.1 ORGANIZATION & COMMUNICATION RECOMMENDATIONS
Clear, well-understood organizational-structure and communication-procedures are fundamental to an
effective emergency-response. These fundamentals ensure that emergency-response procedures are
comprehensive, consistent, and reliable. Without a clear governing structure, emergency operations are
vulnerable to missed information, contradictory decision-making and other pitfalls.
4.1.1 Best Practice: DOT Office(r) of Emergency Management
An Office (or Officer) of Emergency Management within the DOT, independent of the state’s
Department of Emergency Management (DEM, separate from the DOT), is a cornerstone of successful
emergency operations. The OEM functions as the organizing hub of emergency response and has the
authority to activate a DOT-specific EOC without a statewide activation. The DOT’s OEM should include
one or more officers who have experience in emergency management but work closely with highway
maintenance and operations personnel. FEMA’s ICS provides a common organizational framework for
states to follow when launching an OEM.
All of the interviewees were affiliated with their DOT’s emergency-management office or instrumental in
its emergency-response function. All of these offices, departments, and staff positions were created or
resourced within the last 5 to 15 years, as attention to emergency-response planning has increased
nationwide. Each of the states interviewed had between 1 and 6 personnel in the office, department, or
section responsible for emergency management at the DOT.
Emergency management staff from the South Dakota, New York, Michigan and Pennsylvania DOTs
primarily have a background in maintenance at the DOT, but also have experience with emergency
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management and emergency response. Emergency management staff from Colorado and Georgia DOTs
have primarily an emergency management background, but now work for their DOTs in its formalized
OEM. Both of these organizational approaches appeared to be successful.
ICS structure, training, and principles have been implemented in several states to support emergency
management functions. At PennDOT, the implementation of the ICS structure since 2007 has centralized
the coordination of response to emergency winter storms – the position of Section Chief was created and
widespread ICS 300 and 400 training was initiated. PennDOT personnel teach the ICS training, which
makes the material more effective than using outside personnel. New York State DOT specifies ICS
training levels (100 to 400) and ICS organizational assignment for every regional employee. Three
regions in New York have full-time dedicated Regional Emergency Managers (REMS) and eight regions
have part-time REMs with shared responsibilities in other program areas. Colorado DOT's response
structure recognizes ICS and CDOT's place in that system.
After the 2014 storm in Georgia, the Governor accelerated the planning process for emergencies. The
Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) hired a full-time meteorologist and the NWS in Atlanta
began to work more closely with the state agencies, offering impact-oriented forecasts instead of simple
weather forecasts. The response approach became more statewide, including all agencies acting
cooperatively with GEMA as the “holder” of the plans.
4.1.2 Best Practice: Pre-Event Structured Conference Calls
Convening a conference call, with a documented agenda and participant list, whenever a significant
winter storm is forecasted promotes successful planning and execution of emergency operations. The
call facilitates information-sharing and collaborative decision-making for significant events, like
activation of the DOT’s EOC, travel bans, highway restrictions, and messaging on variable message signs.
Major decisions, like activation of the DOT’s EOC should be communicated to the statewide OEM.
Including members of the DOTs of neighboring states on the call ensures that any major decisions like
travel bans will be coordinated for cross-border traffic and prevent miscommunications that might arise
from more indirect communication from multiple sources.
South Dakota DOT (SDDOT) initiates a conference call with the South Dakota Highway Patrol (SDHP) and
forecasters from the NWS whenever a major winter storm is forecasted. Leading up to the onset of the
storm, the conference call is the primary means of communication. For a major winter event that hits the
entire state with more serious impacts like stranded motorists, closed roads, and power outages, a full
EOC activation might also include the Department of Health, the National Guard, and others.
CDOT specifies a Winter Operations’ Conference Call Standard Operating Procedure (see Attachment A),
where emergency procedures are considered collaboratively with NWS. The number of sections (districts)
expected to be affected by a storm is a key measure in considering the initiation of a conference call. In
addition to the Winter Operations Conference Call, CDOT uses WebEOC to manage information flow.
WebEOC is a hosted, web-enabled tool to support crisis management, public safety and emergency
response personnel, by providing simplified access to information that allows other state and local
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agencies to get updates on CDOT’s actions. CDOT can see posts from other agencies, but there is no
dialogue on WebEOC. If the statewide EOC is activated, the Colorado Department of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management will initiate their own conference call, with a CDOT OEM representative in
attendance and multiple agencies in dialogue.
PennDOT convenes a conference call before any forecasted weather event that is expected to affect
more than 1 or 2 of the state’s districts. The call includes engineering districts, county reps,
administration, FHWA, state police, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and
PennDOT’s contract forecaster. It follows a predefined script to ensure that all essential decision points
are covered.
When an event is expected, NYSDOT holds a minimum of two conference calls a day to cover all areas of
DOT response. The initial conference call outlines potential hazards, regional and main-office readiness
levels, agency policies regarding event-specific activities, and additional expectations from department
executives (such as the Commissioner’s or the Governor’s offices).
During major events, TRANSCOM convenes pre, during, and post conference calls with stakeholders
including neighboring states and those in the coalition.
Interviewees reported forecasted storms requiring the convening of a conference call, on average, 4 to 7
times each winter season.
4.1.3 Best Practice: Public Communications Plan
A public communications plan ensures that the public is well informed about expected road conditions,
speed reductions and other information and is valuable for adjusting drivers’ expectations for the
coming storm. The plan should include outreach mechanisms (e.g. traditional and social media) and
specific communication strategies for schools and major employers. Variable message signs can also be
an excellent way of communicating directly with the travelling public.
Public communication ensures success in handling severe winter storms for SDDOT. Whenever SDDOT
knows a storm is coming, the public is alerted that there will be a potential for closures, and reminded
that SDDOT has “hours of operation”, generally from 5am to 7pm. Outside of these times, driving
conditions may be poor, so they should adjust their travel schedules accordingly. By managing the
expectations of the driver, SDDOT helps them make better decisions and become more tolerant. Road
closures and recommended speed limits also communicate indirectly to drivers to change their
expectations.
NYSDOT has concluded that getting early and frequent communication and messaging out to the public
before a storm is the most effective way to reduce its impacts. Messaging should include specific travel
restrictions but should also discourage travel in general during a certain period of time.
PennDOT can also use 511PAConnects to “break into” motorists’ cell phones to provide information
about traffic disruptions that they may be experiencing. 511PAConnect is a trapped-traveler emergency
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communications tool that allows incident response teams to communicate via automated phone or text
message directly with motorists who are trapped in a roadway backup. The tool also gives emergency
crews a clearer picture of who is sitting in a trapped vehicle and where they are, so agencies can better
plan for the use of resources. 511PAConnect is not a mobile app and requires no initial download or
action from motorists. 511PAConnect is only activated during prolonged, emergency roadway stoppages
that are expected to last four or more hours. Upon activation, PEMA will send a push message to all
phones in the incident area.
4.1.4 Best Practice: Extensive RWIS and AVL Coverage
Up-to-date, real-time information is essential for effective emergency operations. Widespread coverage
of RWIS and AVL systems on all RSIC vehicles and equipment enables asset-tracking before and during a
storm. This tracking allows efficient re-allocation of resources and effective communications with the
public about the conditions of roads and the status of RSIC operations.
Most of the interviewees were working toward having 100% of their RSIC vehicles and equipment
outfitted with AVL or similar technology, and adding RWIS stations each year to increase the coverage of
road-weather information. GDOT added 25 more RWIS stations across the state in response to the 2014
emergency, and engaged in more nationwide data-sharing programs. NYSDOT has also installed GPS
units on crucial items such as generators, light towers and sandbaggers for improved asset-tracking. This
location data will be incorporated into the new NYResponds software, which will be complemented by
real-time weather forecasting and modeling through the New York State Early Warning Weather
Detection System.
4.1.5 Best Practice: Regional Coalitions
Regional coalitions provide an information- and data-sharing role to allow their member agencies to
learn from one another through workshops, summits, conferences, and enterprise data platforms.
Regional coalitions can also foster communication between the DOTs of neighboring states, to ensure
that any major decisions like travel bans are coordinated for cross-border traffic.
The I-95 Corridor Coalition provides information of value to states and municipalities in its membership
for preparing or enhancing plans for emergency response to extreme winter weather. Lessons learned
and best practices are discussed. The role of I-95 CC as an information resource, and as a forum for data
sharing amongst its members has resulted in the creation of the Regional Integrated Transportation
Information System (RITIS), which allows its users to see data from other users’ states or municipalities.
RITIS integrates existing data from transportation and public safety systems, the private sector, and the
military. The data is fused and then disseminated to credentialed users through interactive websites.
Another regional coalition that serves a similar role is TRANSCOM, a coalition of 16 transportation and
public-safety agencies in the New York – New Jersey – Connecticut metropolitan region. One of
TRANSCOM’s roles is to be a repository and distribution point for data exchange between member
agencies. TRANSCOM also supports regional technology efforts such as integrated corridor management
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and active traffic management initiatives. Similar to the RITIS is TRANSCOM’s Data Fusion & Analysis
Tools, which collect real-time and historical information from agency and private data sources about
disruptive incidents and events, travel times, transit vehicle locations, and stop arrival/departure times. It
generates a standardized aggregated regional view of roadway and transit conditions every 2 minutes.
4.2 PLANNING, TRAINING, AND REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS
The planning, training and review processes are essential to developing and maintaining a written
emergency-response plan that is effective and integrated into DOT operations. The planning and training
components ensure that a DOT works out the details of its response in advance of an event, and ensures
that personnel are aware of their specific responsibilities. This planning process also provides an
opportunity for a variety of partners to provide input, ensuring that it will be acceptable for all of the
related sections within the DOT, and for other agencies involved like state police. A formalized review
process makes the emergency plan a dynamic document that is updated to reflect changes in resources
and staffing and to reflect new lessons learned so that the plan remains useful of time. An up-to-date
written plan with details of an agency’s practices and procedures also provides continuity of operations
as personnel turn over through the years.
4.2.1 Best Practice: Scalable RSIC Operations Plan
The ability to adjust RSIC operations in response to extreme weather is the core of emergency response.
Scaling RSIC operations is especially challenging since equipment and personnel levels are relatively
fixed in the short-term. Scalable RSIC operations plans should include adjustments to the normal RSIC
routes (at a minimum, interstate routes), personnel work adjustments (e.g., overtime/split-shift
policies), resource-shifting guidelines, and procedures or agreements in place to expedite requests for
external assistance. Ensuring wide circulation of the plan within the DOT, the DEM, and the state police
is essential – affirming this circulation/review with a signature sheet ensures “buy-in”.
South Dakota, New York, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Colorado have active plans for emergency response
to extreme winter weather that each feature elements at the leading edge of the practice:
•

•
•

•

SDDOT, 2016. South Dakota Department of Transportation: Winter Highway Maintenance Plan,
2016-2017. Prepared by Greg Fuller, Director of Operations and Jason Humphrey, Construction
and Maintenance Engineer, South Dakota Department of Transportation, October 2016.
NYSDOT, 2016. Emergency Transportation Operations Playbook, Produced by the New York State
Department of Transportation. Revised October 2016.
GEMA/HS, 2016. Winter Weather Incident Annex : Annex S - Georgia Emergency Operations
Plan. Produced by the Planning Section of the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland
Security Agency, 9/7/2016.
PennDOT, 2015. Chapter 9: Emergency Operations. From the Bureau of Maintenance and
Operations Maintenance Manual, Publication 23 of the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation, Updated 4/15.
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•

CDOT, 2017. Colorado Department of Transportation Emergency Operation Plan. Produced by
the Office of Emergency Management, Department of Transportation, October 2017.

These plans were created, formalized, or enhanced in the last 10 years, as attention to emergency
response planning more generally has improved nationwide. The development of these plans has
institutionalized a set of processes that were previously more informal and decentralized. The
administrative locations of these response plans vary. South Dakota’s plan is within its snow and ice
control operations plan, held by the operations and maintenance staff. Others were in a stand-alone,
DOT-issued emergency response plan, held by the DOT’s emergency management staff. Michigan keeps
only an All-Hazards Plan with a winter-storm incident annex that is held by the Michigan Department of
State Police. This approach is more typical in states that do not have full-time emergency management
staff within the DOT.
SDDOT will move resources if a storm is only going to affect a specific portion of the state and the
forecast is certain. Large or specialized equipment like snow blowers are frequently moved where they
are needed most. SDDOT has travel policies in place for staff to facilitate a temporary move to a different
location covering hotel stays and per diem. SDDOT’s emergency procedures are incorporated into its plan
for normal snow and ice control operations.
South Dakota and Colorado have not had the need to call on other states for support in responding to a
severe winter storm.
Georgia uses a “strike-team” approach in its response to emergency winter weather events. For a state
where winter-weather emergencies can arise from lower-intensity storms with more ice and less snow,
this approach works best. The teams operate along an assigned section of interstate, providing a
complete array of the necessary services – brining, vegetative debris removal, towing, rescue, and state
police response. The team members remain in close radio communication during their response and the
state police provide an escort to enhance the efficiency of the operation, as drivers may not yield or keep
a safe distance without the escort.
NYSDOT’s Critical Response Segments are mapped priority “beats” for maintenance during emergency
winter storms – these “beats” differ from those used for normal snow and ice control. Priority A are
system-critical locations, determined by senior leadership in the region, and the focus is to decrease cycle
times on those highways if you are receiving supplemental resources. Priority B roads come into play if a
Priority A road is closed, then the Priority B road becomes system-critical.
NYSDOT’s “1/3 Fleet” concept dictates the level to which equipment and staff from one location can be
reduced if they are needed elsewhere – essentially creating a “bullpen” for each shop. Most of the time,
for winter storms, assets are being shared from upstate to downstate to create smaller cycle times
NYSDOT does not let any shop fall below the “1/3 Fleet” minimum.
Michigan’s Emergency Management Plan only covers the protection of life and property at a high level
during a winter weather emergency. Michigan Department of State Police is the holder of the document,
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but all agencies have the opportunity to comment on all sections of the MEMP, even the sections that do
not apply to their role as an ESF.
4.2.2 Best Practice: Legal Authority for Road Restrictions
During the most extreme winter-weather events, restrictions on road usage may be required to facilitate
snow removal and maintain motorist safety. Legal authority for these restrictions should be well
established in advance. In coordination with state police, DOT authority to reduce speed limits and/or
close sections of its highway network can be used to protect the safety of the traveling public. These
abilities should be clearly defined and enforceable through state legislation. Exceptions to road closures
should also be noted, including DOT snow and ice control vehicles, emergency response vehicles, and
critical shippers like salt and fuel oil haulers.
PennDOT manages its decisions to restrict or close highways with a multi-level decision tree (Attachment
B). SDDOT interstates feature a system of gates and a specific procedure for how to consider closing an
interstate segment. Neither SDDOT nor SDHP can do it independently – SDDOT has to control the gates
and SDHP sweeps the closed section to make sure no one is “trapped” within the closure. NYSDOT works
with state police frequently on closures. When a road closure is being considered, the state police, the
NYSDOT Commissioner, the New York State Office of Emergency Management, and the Governor’s Office
are all involved.
Although Vermont was not selected for one of the case studies, the Vermont Agency of Transportation
(VTrans) publishes an Emergency Transportation Operation Plan (VTrans, 2015) which includes a detailed
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between VTrans and the Vermont Department of Public Safety
(State Police) regarding the emergency closure of state highways. The MOU is included as Attachment C.
4.2.3 Best Practice: Threat Identification and Assessment
Planning for extreme winter weather requires a clear understanding of the magnitude of “worst case”
winter weather. Failure to undertake periodic threat assessments can leave agencies unprepared for
these worst-case events. Conducting a threat identification and assessment ensures that a full range of
scenarios can be incorporated into the emergency-response plan for extreme winter weather. Threats
described should include type, monthly frequencies, and geographic frequencies (by district).
None of the plans reviewed for this project included a comprehensive threat identification within their
written emergency response plan. NYSDOT documented the types and rates of precipitation to consider
as general guidelines for risk and impacts. They defer to NWS for information about risk levels that
correspond to different storm intensities, and are sensitive to different regions in the state. Most of the
states have a separate all-hazards plan that includes a threat identification and assessment. New York
State’s threat identification and assessment pertaining to winter storms, within its Hazard Mitigation
Plan (produced by the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services), is at the leading edge of
the practice (Attachment D).
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4.2.4 Best Practice: Formalized Training and Review
Emergency operations plans are only effective when they are frequently updated and broadly
disseminated to stakeholders. Formalized training and review protocols help keep response plans up-todate and integrated into agency practice. Established review protocols for emergency winter operations
should including an annual or biannual winter operations meeting, after-action reviews following an
emergency winter storm, and annual circulation, review and update of the written plan. Ongoing
discussions between the DOT’s EOC and the state EOC will help understand the requirements necessary
for statewide EOC activation and if the DOT is included in the decision.
At the beginning of every winter, all SD agencies meet and review what went well last season, as well as
anything that changed since last season to prepare for the coming winter and to familiarize themselves
with the personnel that will be coordinating emergencies in the coming season. The pre-season meeting
allows everyone to discuss lessons learned from the previous winter season. There are also local
meetings in each district, which include local highway patrol staff and local maintenance engineers.
These local meetings can involve local sheriffs, city police, and emergency responders as well.
GEMA/HS convenes a mid-November winter weather exercise – participants show up, communicate,
acknowledge roles, and practice the response. “Buy-in” from the various agencies comes through these
in-person exercises.
NYS also conducts periodic drills of simulated situations which involve the state EOC and various state
agencies. This forum helps identify and plan for worst-case winter events and other situations (mass
casualty incidents, nuclear reactor malfunctions, large-scale power failures, etc.). The NYSDOT regions
have snow and ice kickoff meetings in November every year, led by the regional engineers. The meeting
includes a discussion of operational safety for the changeover of equipment from summer work to winter
work. Issues pertaining to snow and ice maintenance and operations are also discussed. At the system
level, there is at least one statewide drill per year and regions can do individual drills – those are
coordinated through the regional emergency management offices.
Within approximately two weeks after completion of a major event or drill, NYSDOT’s ICS staff develop
and distribute an after-action survey to collect information about the operations related to the event. ICS
staff review and analyze the survey results and organize an after-action review meeting. Following the
completion of these items, an After-Action Report is written by ETO Staff. This report outlines the
Department’s strengths and areas needing improvement, relative to the type of event. The overall goal
of an after action review is to develop an improvement plan and to share best practices across the
agency.
PennDOT uses a structured agenda to conduct its after-action reviews (see Attachment E).
After-action reviews can also be done externally, as a form of audit of the agency’s response. A couple of
years ago, a snow squall created a 100-plus car pileup including chemical spills and fireworks on a major
highway from Detroit to Chicago. After it was cleared and the road re-opened, a contractor was hired by
Michigan DOT to do an after-action review of all response activities, due to the high costs of the incident.
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After-action reviews have also taken the form of tabletop-like exercises, in which a major winter storm is
envisioned in unison with a significant traffic problem. This type of exercise would not constitute a
winter-storm after-action review specifically, but it can be very useful in identifying potential problems
that could arise for a DOT during a severe winter storm.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Given that there are relatively few emergency-response plans for extreme winter weather, the in-depth
interview process essential for uncovering best practices in DOT emergency response. These interviews
were especially useful for uncovering information that not covered in great depth in the written plans,
(1) the organizational structure of the DOT section responsible for the plan, (2) how the plan was being
implemented, and (3) the differing approaches of the case study subjects to managing an emergency
response to extreme winter storms. The case study approach facilitated the development of a concrete
set of recommended best practices for the development of Emergency Response Plans for Extreme
Winter Storms.
While there were many common elements across the case studies, there were also a few differing
approaches that were revealed in the interviews. For example, when discussing procedures for shifting
personnel within the state during an extreme weather event, some of the interviewees felt that it is
important to have the shifted personnel report to the supervisor of the new district they are serving.
Others found that shifted personnel needed to stick with the mission given at the statewide level and
not be distracted by local supervisory directives. Additionally, some agencies are very specific in their
written plans about the roles, procedures, and steps to be taken in a winter weather emergency
whereas others find specificity in written plans to be a deterrent to effective operation during an
emergency, relying instead on training of personnel to help direct the response in the best way.
The involvement of the state’s DEM in a winter weather emergency is perceived differently by different
state DOTs. Some DOTs whose emergency operations’ staff have a DEM background involve the DEM
closely in the DOT response. Others have staff with a maintenance and operations background lead their
emergency response, so the DEM is regarded as peripheral to an effective response to severe winter
weather.
These differences highlight a more general difference between agencies that felt the most effective
response comes from a “bottom-up” approach and other agencies that felt that a “top-down” approach
was most effective. The “bottom-up” approach, which stresses more localized control and autonomy,
was more typical of agencies whose emergency response was led by staff with a maintenance and
operations background. The “top-down” approach, with a firmer centralized mission directive for the
response, was more typical of agencies led by staff with a background in emergency management.
It became clear in the interviews that attitudes of motorists toward winter storms may vary from state
to state. Motorists are free to travel during severe winter weather and are free to choose any route
unless a roadway they choose has been closed. Ultimately, there are steps a DOT can take to lower the
expectations of the travelling public and prompt rescheduling trips around adverse weather events.
Some interviewees believe the motorists in their state to be less tolerant of these types of
inconveniences, and that belief affects their approach to response.
The need for resource-sharing between states also varies regionally. The Midwest Plains’ states tend to
get more widespread winter weather events, so it is likely that a storm severe enough to overwhelm
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one state’s resources would also be impacting adjacent states. However, in the East, where coastal
weather patterns can be dramatically different from inland lake-effects weather patterns, it might be
more common for one state to be hit by a severe winter weather event that has little effect on an
adjacent state, so RSIC responses that include an activation of the EMAC are more realistic.
In spite of these differences, all of the approaches discussed in the interviews appeared to be successful,
and emblematic of best practices. Although the approaches were different, no specific approach
seemed to hinder an agency’s ability to provide an effective response. The differences in approach
seemed to be primarily the result of the background of staff responsible for emergency response to
extreme winter storms. Pursuant to those differences, additional research is need to better understand
the challenges of staffing an Office of Emergency Management within a DOT. Development and
retention of existing staff members for work in emergency management within a DOT will help response
efforts like those covered in this project proceed more effectively. It will be important for DOTs to
understand what job skills are needed for emergency management officers who will be able to
effectively coordinate a response to extreme winter storms. These skills will likely include DOT
operations as well as emergency response experience, which will be more typical of staff in state DEMs.
Providing a framework for the ideal skill set and/or experience of a DOT emergency management officer
will greatly assist DOTs with the development of their OEMs.
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ATTACHMENT A
COLORADO DOT WINTER OPERATIONS CONFERENCE CALL SOP

Winter Operations Conference Call
I. Authorities
A. Article IV, Constitution of the State of Colorado, entitled the Executive Department
B. Title 43, Article 1, Part 1 et seq., C.R.S., entitled Transportation
C. 2016 – 17 CDOT Performance Plan, page 25
II. Purpose
The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is to outline the procedures for the
conduct of a Winter Operations Conference Call due to an impending storm system.
III. Situation

A. Severe winter weather is the most disruptive natural hazard that impacts the statewide
transportation network. Severe winter weather hazards include snowstorms, blizzards,
extreme cold, and ice and sleet storms. As a western state, Colorado is vulnerable to all
of these winter hazards. Most of the severe winter weather events that occur in
Colorado have their origin as Canadian and Arctic cold fronts that move across the State
from the west or northwest, although some of the most significant winter storms have
their origins from the southwest, in combination with Arctic air masses. Colorado
averages moderate to heavy snowfall and extreme cold, averaging 87 days per year
below freezing.
B. Severe winter weather can disrupt the network for a day or two, or for weeks at a time.
The earlier the weather system is identified, it’s projected path (impact area), and
potential severity are identified, the earlier the decisions can be made regarding the
scheduling and deployment of CDOT personnel along with the selection of the
appropriate product(s) to be used. It must be noted, that due to the different
geographical conditions across the State, weather impacts will vary. For example, some
parts of the State can receive 1’ – 2’ of snow with no discernable degradation of
highway operations, while a different location may receive 4” – 6” of snow and traffic
may be at a standstill.
C. Weather Advisories
The National Weather Service (NWS) serves as the primary official source of weather
information. They are responsible for issuing appropriate weather outlooks, watches,
and warnings. Below are the basic terms that should be considered during the planning
process for winter weather:
1. Outlooks indicate a hazardous weather or hydrologic event may develop. Outlooks
are issued up to 7 days prior to the system’s arrival in the area.
2. Watches indicate the risk of a hazardous weather or hydrologic event has increased
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significantly, but its timing, occurrence, and/or location is uncertain. Usually issued
up to 48 hours before arrival.
3. Warnings are issued when a hazardous weather or hydrologic event is occurring, is
imminent, or has a high probability of occurring. It is used for conditions posing a
threat to life or property.
4. Advisories highlight special weather conditions that are less serious than a warning.
They are for events that may cause significant inconvenience, and if caution is not
exercised, it could lead to situations that may threaten life and/or property.
IV. Roles and Responsibilities

A. Winter Operations Manager, Division of Highway Maintenance
1. Monitors severe winter weather system that could adversely impact the State, make
recommendations to the Director of Highway Maintenance regarding future
operations, and facilitate winter operations conference calls.
2. Will make a preliminary determination as to what Incident Level the storm system
will be classified as. If level 4 or 5 is determined, will directly communicate with
impacted maintenance sections on weather conditions and operations. No
consequence management conference call needed. NWS will continue to develop
weather updates. If a level 3 or higher incident level is determined, the more formal
process will take place.
B. Maintenance Sections
Monitor weather conditions within their areas of responsibility, track status of
personnel and equipment, conduct avalanche mitigation operations (on an as needed
basis), and maintain stockpiles of appropriate product.
C. National Weather Service (NWS)
Provides weather forecasts, public warnings, and other weather ‐ related products to
organizations and the public for the purposes of protection, safety, and general
information.
D. Colorado Avalanche Information Center (CAIC)
Provides accurate information about the snowpack stability throughout Colorado for
motorists and backcountry recreationists in order to reduce the number of avalanche
deaths in Colorado. Colorado does not have a very stable snow pack compared to many
other states, and is often considered to be one of the most dangerous mountain areas in
the US.
E. ITERIS
Provides statewide pavement weather forecasting and maintenance decision support
services.
F. Colorado Transportation Management Center
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Through the use of a closed circuit television system, monitors Interstate and State
highway road conditions across the State. Controls fixed variable message signs along
the transportation network and displays appropriate information to the traveling public.
Can also deploy Courtesy Patrols when the need arises.
G. Office Communications
Issues applicable information to the news media and the general population on the
Department’s activities and recommended actions to be taken during hazardous
conditions. This can be accomplished through the headquarters staff or through
Regional staff.
H. Office of Emergency Management
If necessary, provides the interface to the State Emergency Operations Center / Office of
Emergency Management – Colorado Department of Public Safety.
V. Concept of Operations

A. The NWS and the Winter Operations Manager will monitor weather systems that could
directly or indirectly impact the State. When appropriate, the NWS will issue Outlooks,
Watches, and Warnings for parts or all of Colorado. The issuance of these will require
an increased monitoring of the storm system and the identification of potential impacts.
B. The Winter Operations Manager will decide if a Conference Call is necessary. If so, The
Manager will coordinate with the NWS – Boulder and CAIC to acquire a PowerPointTM
presentation on impending conditions prior to the scheduled conference call. Once this
presentation is received, it will be distributed to Cdot_oem_ops@state.co.us .
C. The Winter Operations Manager will schedule the Conference Call (traditionally at
12:30pm) with the appropriate sections, using a calendar invite. Attendees will include:
1. Brian Lazar brian.lazar@state.co.us
2. CAIC – Colorado Avalanche Center caic@state.co.us
3. CMTC Branch Manager – Bill Miederhoff William.miederhoff@state.co.us
4. CMTC Supervisor – Rod Mead rod.mead@state.co.us
5. Director Division of Highway Maintenance – Kyle Lester kyle.lester@state.co.us
6. Director TSM&O – Ryan Rice ryan.rice@state.co.us
7. Ethan Greene ethan.greene@state.co.us
8. I‐25 Corridor Manager – Kevin Devine kevin.devine@state.co.us
9. I‐70 Corridor Manager – Patrick Chavez Patrick.chavez@state.co.us
10. Iteris wxservices@iteris.com
11. NWS Boulder cr.bou‐ops@noaa.gov
12. NWS Grand Junction cr.gjt@noaa.gov
13. NWS Pueblo cr.pueblo@noaa.gov
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14. OEM Director – Chad Ray chad.ray@state.co.us
15. OEM Communications – Jack Cobb jack.cobb@state.co.us
16. OEM Operations – Jori Ernst jori.ernst@state.co.us
17. OEM Planning Section Chief – Kerry Kimble Kerry.kimble@state.co.us
18. Pathfinder Project Manager – Lisa Streisfeld lisa.streisfeld@state.co.us
19. Winter Operations Manager – David Johnson c.david.johnson@state.co.us
D. CDOT ‐ OEM Conference Bridge will be used: 1‐877‐820‐7831 (Participation Code:
118127#, Moderator Code: 9147541)
E. The Conference Call will be facilitated by the Winter Operations Manager using the
following agenda (the form at the end of the SOP can also be used):
1. National Weather Service – Statewide briefing of current forecast with identified
weather matrix.
a. Storm anticipated beginning and ending times.
b. Snow accumulations, rate per hour, winds, gusts and visibility.
2. CAIC – Colorado Avalanche Information Center
a. Brief on potential avalanche issues within the impacted areas of the storm
b. CAIC will be included on conference calls 12 hours pre storm.
3. Iteris – Statewide briefings focused on current conditions and roadway weather.
a. Utilize roadway sensors for actual and current impacts.
b. Utilize MDSS for current and forecasted roadway impacts.
4. Each Maintenance Section should be prepared to update and present the following
information for situational awareness during the conference call:
a. Current operations being conducted
b. Current status of equipment, personnel or product (including needs, shortages
or concerns).
c. Any areas of concern (geographical areas, infrastructure or impacts).
d. Any communication issues (public information issues or 800 Mhz communication
issues).
e. Need for any additional resources.
f. Can you sustain continued operations for another 24 hours?
g. Who is the event coordinator?
5. CTMC
a. Staffing status.
b. Need for the snow desk.
c. Need for the Courtesy Patrol.
d. Any concerns or issues?
6. The group will discuss what Incident Level the storm should be (and the resulting
actions to be taken). For general consideration:
a. Level 3: 3 ‐ 4 maintenance sections will be required to deploy road clearing staff
for extended periods of operations or the scheduling of additional shifts
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throughout the entirety of the event. A Departmental Incident Management
Team is activated.
b. Level 2: 5 ‐ 6 maintenance sections will be required to deploy road clearing staff
for extended periods of operations or the scheduling of additional shifts
throughout the entirety of the event. Resources from non – impacted
maintenance sections are being re – directed (internal mutual aid).
c. Level 1: A statewide event that will impact 7 or 8 maintenance sections will be
required to deploy road clearing staff for extended periods of operations or the
scheduling of additional shifts throughout the entirety of the event. A re –
distribution of internal resources is conducted (internal mutual aid).
Consideration of coordination with neighboring States for the clearing of
highways beyond the political border (this would apply for CDOT plowing
another State’s portion of the highway, and their DOT organization may plow
Colorado’s portion of the highway.) (External mutual aid.) The Departmental
Operations Center is activated.
d. A decision tree is located in Appendix 1.
7. Public Information
a. What is the overall message that we want to put out?
b. Who will be responsible for that message, the Regions or HQ?
8. The Winter Operations Manager will schedule a follow – up Conference Call if
necessary.
VI. Documentation

At the end of the Conference Call, the conversation / decisions made need to be
documented. One option for this documentation is to utilize the form below.
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Appendix 1
Decision Tree for Incident Levels
NWS
Outlooks
Watches
Warnings

Yes

Coordinate
with Impact
Sections

Localized
Event

No

How
many
sections

5-6

3-4

7-8
Yes

Yes

Yes

No
Monitor

No

Extended
Opers

Extended
Opers

Extended
Opers

No
Monitor
Internal
MA

Initiate
Contact

Monitor

Internal
MA

No

Initiate
Call

No

External
MA

Initiate
Call
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ATTACHMENT B
PENNDOT DECISION TREES FOR RESTRICTION PROTOCOLS

Decision Tree for Weather Related Restrictions on Interstate/Limited Access
Highways
Winter Event is Imminent
Area Command may be Activating

Area Command
Activation/
Oversight if not
Previously
Activated

Post Messages per
DMS Operating
Guidelines

Winter weather occurring,
Interstate Conditions
reported at 2 anticipated to
go to Condition 3

Enact DMS/HARS?

No

Normal Operations

Monitor to
Termination

Enact Speed Limit
Reduction Protocol

Consideration when
Interstate Conditions reported
at 3 over District Interstate
corridor

Enact Speed Limit
Reduction?

No

Normal Operations

2 hours to enact

Enact Commercial
Vehicle Restriction
Protocol

Consideration when
Interstate Conditions reported
at 3 over District Interstate
Corridor or ½” ice forecasted
over 2 hours, snow exceed 3”
per hour over four hours,
high winds/drifting

Enact Commercial
Vehicle Restriction?

No

Normal Operations

2 additional hours to enact

Monitor until restrictions are
removed or returned to next
lowest restriction

Enact On Ramp
Interstate Restriction
Protocol

Consideration when
Interstate Conditions reported
at 4 over District Interstate
Corridor or ½” ice forecasted
over 2 hours, snow exceed 3”
per hour over four hours,
high winds/drifting
Governors Declaration
necessary

Enact Main Line
Interstate Restriction
Protocol

Consideration when
Interstate Conditions reported
at 4 over District Interstate
Corridor or ½” ice forecasted
over 2 hours, snow exceed 3”
per hour over four hours,
high winds/drifting.

Enact On Ramp
Interstate
Restriction?

No

Normal Operations

3 additional hours to enact

Enact Main Line
Interstate
Restriction?

No

Normal Operations

2 additional hours to enact
Governors Declaration
necessary

PennDOT Winter Weather Pre-Emptive Restrictions
Event Forecasted

Area Command evaluates storm through
District Pre-Event Conference Call, PEMA
and independent weather sources

Area Command discusses potential of
proactively initiating Interstate Restrictions
with ADE-M including preemptive MET
moves

Determination if or
what level of restrictions
to enact

Monitor Conditions

Area Command evaluates time frame to
enact restrictions within pre-established time
frames for each restriction

Area Command relays information to
Secretary/Designee, PEMA, PennDOT
Press

No
Area Command Planning
- Other state DMS activation?
- Standard DMS message
- Coordination with PSP,PTC, DMVA
- Identify which other state partners need
to be contacted, FHWA, DOT, Transcom,
PMTA
- Prepare 511 floodgate messages
- PIO to craft a press release with PEMA
and PSP and Turnpike PIOs
- Determine corridors to restrict
- Pre-notification to adjacent state DOT
- DMVA availability and coordination with
County operations
- Pre-notification of impacted states DOT
or TMC
- PEMA notification to EMA coordinators
- pre-load RCRS for vehicle restrictions
and time of restriction
- pre-load 511 floodgate message
- Area Command PIO works with PEMA
JIC for press release
- AC to confirm PSP enforcement
capabilities
- MET activation for assistance pre-event
- Extent/corridors of restrictions

Secretary/Designee
Approval

Area Commander relays information and
time of restrictions to District ICC, PEMA,
PennDOT Press and PSP

District ICC to follow flow charts for
specific Restriction Protocols

Monitor restriction to
termination

Re-evaluate

PennDOT Interstate/Limited Access Reduced Speed Limit Process (Condition 3)
Event Forecasted

County requests reduced Interstate speed limit
to
District ICC

District and Area Command evaluates
potential of reduction when Interstate
Conditions are Condition 3 or forecasted to
create a Condition 3 for over 4 hours

No
Existing Operations

District ICC
Review

District Planning

District ICC evaluates time frame to enact
reduced speeds with a minimum 2 hour lead
time

District IC relays intent to Area Commander

- Location and availability of
DMS
- What DMS will be activated?
- Is HAR available?
- Coordination with local PSP
- Standard message
- Will additional/portable DMS
be needed?
- PIO to craft a press release

No
Area Command
Review

No
Area Command time
frame review

Extend time frame

Area Commander relays information to
Secretary/Designee, PEMA, PennDOT Press
and PSP

No
Re-evaluate

Secretary/Designee
Approval

Area Commander relays information and time
of reduced speed to District ICC, PEMA,
PennDOT Press

District ICC to enact limits with HAR and VMS
and coordinate with PSP

Monitor restriction to termination

Area Commander relays to District IC
to continue to monitor

PennDOT Interstate Commercial Vehicle Restriction Protocol (Condition 3)
Condition 3 predominate over
District Interstate Corridor
District and Area Command evaluates
potential of reduction when Interstate
Conditions are Condition 3 and
increasing over the district/interstate
corridor. Ice is forecast for …...

District ICC or Area Command identifies need for
commercial vehicle restrictions

District Planning
District ICC evaluates time frame and logistics to
enact commercial vehicle restrictions with a
minimum 2 hour lead time

No
Routine Operations

Commercial/Restricted Vehicle List
-

Area Commander
Assessment

Re-assess

Empty Trailer trucks
Permitted Loads
RV/Campers
Motorcycles
Combination Loads
All Commercial Vehicles
Twin Trailer
Straight Trailer
Vehicles with tow behind trailers

- location and availability of DMS
- what DMS will be activated?
- is HAR available?
- coordination with local PSP
- standard message
- will additional/portable DMS be
needed?
- PIO to craft a local press release
- District to plan and determine if
Comercial vehicle restrictions are
warrented on non-interstate routes
and the impact of restricting noninterstate routes

Area Command evaluates the types of commercial
vehicles to restrict and adjacent district impacts with
District ICCs a minimum 2 hours prior to restriction

Area Command discusses restrictions with PEMA
and EPLO’s from PSP and Turnpike (resolve TPK
conflicts)

Area Commander relays information to Secretary/
Designee, PEMA, PennDOT Press, PSP & TPK

No
Restriction Approval?

Area Commander confirms information and time of
reduced speed to District ICCs, PEMA, PennDOT
Press, TPK, PSP

Enact restrictions by District ICC with ITS devices,
511, RCRS ICP, Area Command to coordinate with
PSP, TPK and other states

No
Monitor restriction to
termination

Include Limited
Access Routes?

Follow procedures for
Restricting Interstate
Traffic

Re-assess

PennDOT response to Turnpike Commercial Vehicle Restriction Protocol
Turnpike identifies plans to enact
commercial vehicle restrictions

Area Command Information
(refer to checklist)

- Location of the restriction exit to
exit
- Vehicle types being restricted
- Which turnpike routes (NE
extension, Route 43, 66)
- Existing traffic being taken off PTC
- Are detours being provided using
state routes
- PennDOT restrictions in place
- Will PennDOT follow with
restrictions?

Notification to PennDOT
EPLO from PTC EPLO of
restriction
(from PTC Weather
Emergency Traffic
Management Plan)

Wind or accident
restriction

Cause of restriction

Winter Weather
Localized
by exit

Determine if PTC
is providing
alternate routes
information

Restriction extent

Determine from
County or District
ICC impact to their
system

Total system
or corridor

Area Command Decision Questions

No

(refer to checklist)

- Is the condition of the PTC
representative of DOT roads?
- Is PTC alleviating congestion?
- Will this cause pinch points where
DOT roads intersect PTC toll booths?
- Length of time PTC expects the
restrictions to be in place
- Are these being enacted as a
preemptive measure
- Turnpike resources availability to
plow interchanges where DOT roads
intersect to alleviate DOT needs to
reallocate resources

PennDOT to follow
with restrictions

Area Command
will work any
potential conflicts
with PTC
regarding their
alternate routes

Yes

Follow
Commercial
Vehicle
Restriction
Protocol

Activate any DMS
or HARS to
alleviate DOT
traffic entering
PTC booths

Monitor and reassess with
PTC until termination

PennDOT Interstate On Ramp Restriction Protocol (Condition 4)
Condition 4 predominate over District Interstate system and
reduced traffic volumes are not sufficient from Vehicle
Restrictions
District and Area Command evaluates
potential of reduction when Interstate
Conditions are Condition 4 over the
entire district/corridor, or ½ “ ice
forecasted over 2 hours, snow exceeds
3” per hour over four hours,
high winds/drifting

District ICC or Area Command identifies need
for reduced traffic volumes on interstates

District ICC evaluates time frame to enact
Interstate On Ramp Restrictions with a
minimum 3 hour lead time

No
Area Commander
Review

Normal Operations

District Planning
- Location and availability of DMS
- DOT resources which can be
brought in for MPT
- Can windrow options be executed?
- Coordination with local PSP
- Will additional/portable DMS or
barriers be needed?
- PIO to craft a local press release
- Identify pre-planned exits which will
be restricted
- Identify remaining exits to be
closed if necessary and the
resources necessary to close
remaining exits
- Determine and plan for expanding
restriction to non-interstate limited
access routes
- Identify time to fully execute onramp restrictions
- Identify potential time to re-open

Area Command evaluates the interstate
corridors to restrict with District ICCs and
PEMA a minimum 2 hours prior to restriction

Area Command discusses restrictions with
PEMA, PSP, DMVA and Turnpike (resolve
PTC conflicts)

Area Commander relays information to
Secretary/Designee, PEMA, PennDOT Press,
PSP & PTC

No
Restriction Approval?

Re-assess

Area Commander confirms information and
time to enact ramp restrictions to District ICCs,
PEMA, PennDOT Press, PTC, PSP

Enact restrictions by District ICC with ITS
devices, 511, RCRS ICP, Area Command to
coordinate with PSP, PTC and other states

Review, plan and prepare to extend ramp
restrictions to remaining exits if necessary

No
Monitor restriction to
termination

Include Limited
Access Routes?

Follow procedures for
Restricting Interstate
Traffic

PennDOT Interstate Mainline Restriction Protocol (Condition 4)
Condition 4 predominate over District Interstate system and
reduced traffic volumes are not sufficient from On Ramp and
Commercial Vehicle Restrictions
District and Area Command evaluates
potential of reduction when Interstate
Conditions are Condition 4 over the
entire district/corridor, or ½ “ ice
forecasted over 2 hours, snow exceeds
3” per hour over four hours,
high winds/drifting

District ICC or PEMA identifies need for total restriction of
traffic on interstates

District ICC evaluates time frame to enact Main Line Interstate
Restrictions with a minimum 2 hour lead time

No
Area Commander
Review

Normal Operations

District Planning
- Location and availability of DMS
- DOT resources which can be
brought in for MPT
- Can windrow options be executed?
- Coordination with local PSP
- Will additional/portable DMS or
barriers be needed?
- PIO to craft a local press release
- Identify remaining exits to be
closed if necessary and the
resources necessary to close those
exits and resources necessary to
close the main line
- Identify to emergency responders
Off ramps will be open to allow for
emergency transport utilizing
Interstate system
- Identify time to fully execute onramp restrictions
- Identify potential time to re-open

Area Command evaluates the interstate corridors and extents to
restrict with District ICCs and PEMA a minimum 2 hours prior to
restriction and evaluates current restrictions effectiveness

Area Command discusses restrictions with PEMA, PSP, DMVA
and Turnpike (resolve PTC conflicts)

District determination of parked traffic currently utilizing road side
rest areas

District and Area Command determine if appropriate time exists
to staff and close all on-ramps to interstates

Area Commander relays information to Secretary/Designee,
PEMA, PennDOT Press, PSP & PTC

No
Restriction Approval?

Re-assess

Area Commander confirms information and time to enact ramp
restrictions to District ICCs, PEMA, PennDOT Press, PTC, PSP

Enact restrictions by District ICC with ITS devices, 511, RCRS
ICP, Area Command to coordinate with PSP, PTC and other
states

District ICC to monitor conditions and duration of restriction with
1 hour reporting to Area Command

No
Monitor restriction to
termination

Include Limited
Access Routes?

Follow procedures for
Restricting Mainline
Interstate Traffic

ATTACHMENT C
VTRANS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING
EMERGENCY CLOSURE OF HIGHWAYS

ATTACHMENT D
2014 NEW YORK STATE HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN SEVERE
WINTER STORM THREAT ASSESSMENT

2014 New York State Hazard Mitigation Plan

Severe Winter Storm

Section 3.15: SEVERE WINTER STORM
2014 SHMP Updates





Annual average snowfall map has been added.
Historical and Recent Events and Losses table added.
Presidential Declared Disaster table and map has been added.
Vulnerability and loss data from local plans have been addressed.

3.15.1

Winter Storm Profile

New York State is located at relatively high latitude and exposed to large quantities of
moisture from the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean; therefore, it is highly susceptible to
severe winter storms. Occasionally these storms are large enough to encompass almost the
entire state.
Hazard

Terms and Definitions






Winter Storm








Weather Advisory – this alert may be issued for a variety of severe
conditions. Weather advisories may be announced for snow, blowing
or drifting snow, freezing drizzle, freezing rain, or a combination of
weather events.
Winter Storm Watch – severe winter weather conditions may affect
your area (freezing rain, sleet or heavy snow may occur separately
or in combination).
Winter Storm Warning – severe winter weather conditions are
imminent.
Freezing Rain or Freezing Drizzle – rain or drizzle is likely to freeze
upon impact, resulting in a coating of ice glaze on roads and all other
exposed objects.
Sleet – small particles of ice usually mixed with rain. If enough sleet
accumulates on the ground, it makes travel hazardous.
Blizzard Warning – sustained wind speeds of at least 35 mph are
accompanied by considerable falling or blowing snow. This alert is
the most perilous winter storm with visibility dangerously
restricted.
Frost/Freeze Warning – below freezing temperatures are expected
and may cause significant damage to plants, crops and fruit trees.
Wind Chill – a strong wind combined with a temperature slightly
below freezing can have the same chilling effect as a temperature
nearly 50 degrees lower in a calm atmosphere. The combined
cooling power of the wind and temperature on exposed flesh is
called the wind-chill factor.
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Characteristics
Severe Winter Storm is defined as an event that occurs during the winter season that
includes one or more of the following conditions: snow, ice, high winds, blizzard conditions,
and other wintry conditions; causing physical damage or loss to improved property (NWS,
2013). It can range from a moderate snow over a few hours to a blizzard with blinding
wind driven snow that can last for multiple days. During late October through mid-April,
temperatures can range between 0 degree Fahrenheit and 32 degree Fahrenheit with
February having the greatest average snowfall. Cold moisture combined with high wind
and large accumulations of snow cause “Lake Effect” storms. Lake Effect storms leave huge
quantities of snow with a few days in its wake. They primarily affect the western and
central region of New York, but have been known to affect the eastern portion of the State,
if the storm becomes large enough.
Extreme cold and heavy
snowfall can immobilize the
entire state causing road
closures,
power
outages,
disruption in communication
services, and no heat for
several days, under the most
severe circumstances. Severe
storms can require persons to
abandon their homes and seek
shelter.
The severity or magnitude of a
severe winter storm depends
on several factors including a February 8, 2013, Winter Storm Nemo caused New York, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island to declare states of
region’s
climatological emergency after dumping a massive three feet of snow across the North
susceptibility to snowstorms, East Coast.
snowfall amounts and rates,
wind speeds, temperatures, visibility, storm duration, topography, time, day of the week,
and season.
The extent of a severe winter storm can be classified by meteorological measurements,
such as those above, and by evaluating its societal impacts. The Northeast Snowfall Impact
Scale (NESIS) categorizes snowstorms, including Nor’easter events, in this manner. Unlike
the Fujita Scale, which measures the impact of tornados and Saffir-Simpson Scale, which
classify hurricanes, there is no widely used scale to categorize snowstorms. NESIS was
developed by Paul Kocin of The Weather Channel and Louis Uccellini of the National
Weather Service (NWS) to characterize and rank high impacts of northeastern snowstorms.
These storms have large areas of 10 inch snowfall accumulations and greater. NESIS has
five ranking categories: Notable (1), Significant (2), Major (3), Crippling (4), and Extreme
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(5). Table 3.15a identifies and describes each ranking. The index differs from other
meteorological indices in that it uses population information in addition to meteorological
measurements. Thus, NESIS gives an indication of a storm's societal impacts. This scale
was developed because of the impact northeast snowstorms can have on the rest of the
country in terms of transportation and economic impact (Kocin and Uccellini, 2011).
Table 3.15a: NESIS Ranking Categories
Category Description

NESIS Range

1

Notable

1.0 – 2.49

2

Significant

2.5 – 3.99

3

Major

4.0 – 5.99

4

Crippling

6.0 – 9.99

5

Extreme

10+

Definition
These storms are notable for their large
areas of 4-inch accumulations and small
areas of 10-inch snowfall.
Includes storms that produce significant
areas of greater than 10-inch snows while
some include small areas of 20-inch
snowfalls. A few cases may even include
relatively small areas of very heavy snowfall
accumulations (greater than 30 inches).
This category encompasses the typical major
Northeast snowstorm, with large areas of
10-inch snows (generally between 50 and
150 × 103 mi.2— roughly one to three times
the size of New York State with significant
areas of 20-inch accumulations
These storms consist of some of the most
widespread, heavy snows of the sample and
can be best described as crippling to the
northeast U.S, with the impact to
transportation and the economy felt
throughout the United States. These storms
encompass huge areas of 10-inch snowfalls,
and each case is marked by large areas of 20inch and greater snowfall accumulations.
The storms represent those with the most
extreme snowfall distributions, blanketing
large areas and populations with snowfalls
greater than 10, 20, and 30 inches. These are
the only storms in which the 10-inch
accumulations exceed 200 × 103 mi2 and
affect more than 60 million people.

Source: Kocin and Uccellini, 2004

NESIS scores are a function of the area affected by the snowstorm, the amount of snow, and
the number of people living in the path of the storm. These numbers are calculated into a
raw data number ranking from “1” for an insignificant fall to over “10” for a massive
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snowstorm. Based on these raw numbers, the storm is placed into its decided category. The
largest NESIS values result from storms producing heavy snowfall over large areas that
include major metropolitan centers (Enloe, 2011).
While it is almost certain that a number of significant winter storms will occur during the
fall and winter seasons, it is difficult to predict how many storms will occur during that
time frame. For example, during the calendar year 1997, three (3) significant winter
storms occurred. In contrast, during the calendar year 2000, the State encountered sixteen
(16) storms.

Location
On average, New York receives more snow fall than other states within the United States.
Average annual snowfall is about 65 inches, but it varies greatly in different regions of the
State. Although the entire State is subject to severe winter storms, the easternmost and
west-central portions of the State are more likely to suffer under severe winter storm
occurrences than the southern portion.
Albany, Syracuse, Buffalo and Rochester are typically in the top ten cities in the nation in
annual snowfall. Hamilton and Essex are rural low populous counties and home to the six
(6) million-acre Adirondack Park, which also receive extensive annual snowfall. Parts of
Chautauqua, Herkimer, Jefferson, Oswego, and Lewis Counties receive the heaviest snowfall
averaging 96-220 inches annually. The coastal region of the State has the lightest annual
snowfall, but is extremely vulnerable to Nor’easters if a hurricane or coastal storm occurs.
Figure 3.15a is a map of historical average snowfall totals for the State. The National
Weather Service’s Cooperative Observer Program (COOP) collects daily meteorological
data, including snowfall. Monthly totals for the years of 1960-2012 were used to create the
annual average surface from the COOP stations. This figure shows a clear visual of areas
that are subject to future occurrences and vulnerable to high levels of snowfall.
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Figure 3.15a: New York Annual Average Snowfall 1960-2012
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FEMA 9523.1 Snow Assistance Policy
Entities that meet the applicant eligibility, 44 CFR §206.222, and are performing work that
meets the requirements of general work eligibility, 44 CFR §206.223, are eligible for snow
assistance.
Eligible work, under Category B, emergency protective measures, as described in the
Public Assistance Guide, FEMA 322 (PDF), includes snow removal, snow dumps, de-icing,
salting, and sanding of roads and other facilities essential to eliminate or lessen immediate
threats to life, public health, and safety. In addition, activities related to the snowstorm
such as search and rescue, sheltering, and other emergency protective measures are
eligible work. Other categories of work may be eligible under a snowstorm declaration
where appropriate.
In a major disaster declaration for a Severe Winter Storm, snow removal costs are not
eligible for FEMA assistance if the county does not meet the requirements for snow
assistance under paragraph (B) of this policy. A limited level of snow removal incidental
to disaster response may be eligible for assistance. Generally, snow removal that is
necessary to perform otherwise eligible emergency work is eligible. For example, snow
removal necessary to access debris or to repair downed power lines is eligible, while
normal clearance of snow from roads is not eligible. (FEMA, 2013)

Previous Winter Storm Occurrences
New York State Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES)
Mitigation staff researched several data sources for historical winter storm records
including NYS Office of Emergency Management archives, FEMA statistics, Disaster
Declaration data, Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Databases for the United States
(SHELDUS), and NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) storm event database.
According to FEMA, 11 major severe winter storm events occurred from 1976 to 2013
causing Presidential Disaster Declarations. Table 3.15a documents severe winter storm
Presidential declaration events that occurred from 1976-2013 (excluding emergency
declarations).
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Table 3.15b: Severe Winter Storm Presidential Declarations 1976-2013
Disaster
Number

Date Declared

DR-4111

4/23/2013

Suffolk County

DR-1957

2/18/2011

Nassau and Suffolk Counties

DR-1827

3/4/2009

DR-1467

5/12/2003

DR-1404

3/1/2002

DR-1196

1/6/1998

DR-1083

1/12/1996

DR-898

3/21/1991

DR-801

11/10/1987

DR-527

2/5/1977

DR-494

3/19/1976

Affected Locations

Albany, Columbia, Delaware, Greene, Rensselaer, Saratoga,
Schenectady, Schoharie and Washington Counties
Cayuga, Chenango, Livingston, Madison, Monroe, Oneida,
Onondaga, Ontario, Orleans, Oswego, Otsego, Schenectady,
Seneca, Wayne, and Yates Counties
Erie County
Clinton, Essex, Franklin, Jefferson, Lewis, and Saint
Lawrence Counties
Albany, Bronx, Columbia, Delaware, Dutchess, Greene,
Kings, Nassau, New York, Orange, Putnam, Queens,
Rensselaer, Richmond, Rockland County, Suffolk, Sullivan,
Ulster, and Westchester Counties
Allegany, Genesee, Jefferson, Lewis, Livingston, Monroe,
Ontario, Orleans, Saint Lawrence, Steuben, Wayne,
Wyoming, and Yates Counties
Albany, Columbia, Dutchess, Greene, Putnam, Rensselaer,
Saratoga, Schenectady, and Washington Counties
Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee, Jefferson, Lewis,
Niagara, Orleans, and Wyoming Counties
Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee, Livingston,
Monroe, and Wyoming Counties

Figure 3.15b displays the Presidential declared disaster totals by county for winter events
for the period of 1954 through July 2013. Monroe and Genesee Counties have the highest
number of winter declarations.
Figure 3.15c references NYS winter events by county from 1960-2012. The highest
number of Severe Winter Storm occurrences from 1960-2012 were in Western, Central and
Northern New York State. On average 290-370 events were reported in the following
counties: Chautauqua, Erie, Oswego, Oneida, Lewis, St. Lawrence, Franklin, Clinton and
Essex. The lowest number of occurrences was along the coastal region of the State in
Suffolk, Nassau, Bronx, Queens, Kings, Richmond, Rockland and Westchester Counties with
60-89 events

3.15-7

Final Release Date January 4, 2014

Severe Winter Storm

2014 New York State Hazard Mitigation Plan
Figure 3.15b: Presidential Disaster Declarations for Winter Events for 1954- 2013
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Figure 3.15c: New York Winter Events by County 1960-2012
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SHELDUS data reports 11,876 severe winter storm event occurrences throughout New York State from 1960 to 2012; with
property damage exceeding $1.7 billion. Additionally, 327 storm events occurred in 26 out of 62 counties from 2010-2012;
property damage was approximately $4.2 million. From 1960 to 2012, 503 fatalities occurred, 2,560 injuries were reported,
and crop damage exceeded $27 million. Table 3.15c represents historical and recent severe winter storm events and losses.
Table 3.15c: Historical and Recent Severe Winter Storm Events and Losses

Injuries

195

11

60

$48,308,713

$222,108

10

0

0

$165,000

$40,000

Allegany

290

0.34

151

4

7

$14,585,332

$49,259

0

0

0

$0

$0

Bronx

125

0.80

65

4

25

$3,187,310

$23

1

0

0

$0

$0

Broome

335

0.30

174

8

49

$22,342,815

$892,969

0

0

0

$0

$0

Cattaraugus

538

0.19

280

11

8

$18,871,011

$99,259

16

0

0

$363,000

$60,000

Cayuga

533

0.19

277

6

21

$17,199,331

$964,898

11

0

0

$153,000

$0

Chautauqua

581

0.17

302

7

11

$20,008,714

$139,259

14

0

0

$228,000

$100,000

Chemung

250

0.40

130

4

8

$3,608,059

$9,259

0

0

0

$0

$0

Chenango

423

0.24

220

6

51

$24,948,711

$226,610

0

0

0

$0

$0

Clinton

610

0.16

317

5

30

$24,244,805

$1,147,345

31

0

0

$320,000

$125,000

Columbia

294

0.34

153

10

62

$50,487,953

$228,458

0

0

0

$0

$0

Cortland

452

0.22

235

8

60

$24,354,205

$216,610

0

0

0

$0

$0

Delaware

350

0.29

182

8

81

$50,062,019

$892,969

0

0

0

$0

$0

Dutchess

302

0.33

157

16

67

$49,255,537

$892,742

0

0

0

$0

$0

Erie

573

0.17

298

11

12

$57,206,821

$74,259

18

0

0

$385,000

$40,000

Essex

627

0.16

326

3

35

$24,292,489

$1,077,901

33

0

0

$282,000

$50,000

Franklin

623

0.16

324

4

35

$24,451,784

$1,097,345

31

0

0

$231,000

$75,000
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Injuries

222

11

76

$23,434,361

$221,897

0

0

0

$0

$0

0.28

183

8

6

$55,135,364

$964,815

4

0

0

$60,000

$0

Greene

342

0.29

178

6

65

$48,721,694

$178,708

1

1

1

$0

$0

Hamilton

460

0.22

239

8

76

$24,492,612

$1,047,751

0

0

0

$0

$0

Herkimer

529

0.19

275

14

93

$53,224,195

$1,059,923

0

0

0

$0

$0

Jefferson

527

0.19

274

5

25

$23,762,578

$215,926

14

0

0

$180,000

$40,000

Kings

123

0.81

64

4

31

$3,178,727

$23

1

0

0

$0

$0

Lewis

637

0.16

331

5

16

$20,118,702

$251,770

23

0

0

$326,000

$38,000

Livingston

296

0.34

154

4

7

$26,404,955

$1,114,815

7

0

0

$115,000

$50,000

Madison

502

0.20

261

13

95

$27,409,298

$226,673

0

0

0

$0

$0

Monroe

363

0.28

189

12

8

$58,982,826

$1,064,815

7

0

0

$125,000

$0

Montgomery

427

0.23

222

11

84

$51,797,855

$221,897

0

0

0

$0

$0

Nassau

125

0.80

65

6

25

$3,178,727

$23

0

0

0

$0

$0

New York

117

0.85

61

31

25

$3,178,227

$23

2

0

0

$0

$0

Niagara

346

0.29

180

9

9

$52,395,560

$989,815

6

0

0

$95,000

$0

Oneida

610

0.16

317

31

109

$27,749,142

$226,589

0

0

0

$0

$0

Onondaga

410

0.24

213

7

23

$9,246,255

$47,186

0

0

0

$0

$0

Ontario

296

0.34

154

5

6

$18,037,569

$1,114,815

6

0

0

$65,000

$50,000

Orange

260

0.39

135

13

66

$51,378,251

$892,994

1

1

1

$0

$0

Orleans

319

0.31

166

8

6

$48,866,215

$964,815

5

0

0

$85,000

$0

Oswego

715

0.14

372

6

13

$20,448,562

$1,146,481

21

0

0

$483,000

$15,000

Otsego

487

0.21

253

14

87

$27,456,976

$231,673

0

0

0

$0

$0

Putnam

238

0.42

124

5

63

$48,963,490

$892,744

0

0

0

$0

$0
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Injuries

65

5

40

$3,178,727

$23

1

0

0

$0

$0

0.36

146

6

52

$47,911,109

$184,014

0

0

0

$0

$0

Richmond

115

0.87

60

4

26

$3,173,231

$23

0

0

0

$0

$0

Rockland

160

0.63

83

4

32

$31,256,617

$9,284

0

0

0

$0

$0

Saratoga

390

0.26

203

8

142

$49,126,368

$221,858

0

0

0

$0

$0

Schenectady

375

0.27

195

7

60

$48,351,389

$221,858

0

0

0

$0

$0

Schoharie

437

0.23

227

8

78

$24,508,827

$216,592

0

0

0

$0

$0

Schuyler

256

0.39

133

4

10

$8,412,743

$9,259

0

0

0

$0

$0

Seneca

287

0.35

149

4

12

$8,322,264

$9,259

0

0

0

$0

$0

St Lawrence

719

0.14

374

10

44

$26,565,519

$1,272,343

43

0

0

$297,000

$250,000

Steuben

225

0.44

117

5

7

$11,182,784

$9,259

0

0

0

$0

$0

Suffolk

135

0.74

70

12

51

$3,235,509

$23

0

0

0

$0

$0

Sullivan

273

0.37

142

3

42

$47,891,131

$892,969

0

0

0

$0

$0

Tioga

354

0.28

184

5

42

$24,516,058

$892,969

0

0

0

$0

$0

Tompkins

275

0.36

143

7

13

$5,708,247

$9,259

0

0

0

$0

$0

Ulster

337

0.30

175

12

67

$49,207,868

$178,708

0

0

0

$0

$0

Warren

365

0.27

190

5

63

$47,673,307

$219,684

0

0

0

$0

$0

Washington

294

0.34

153

8

55

$47,331,119

$181,840

0

0

0

$0

$0

Wayne

438

0.23

228

7

11

$25,269,775

$1,064,815

8

0

0

$155,000

$0

Westchester

171

0.58

89

5

65

$31,362,912

$25

0

0

0

$0

$0

Wyoming

421

0.24

219

6

7

$19,629,080

$59,259

12

0

0

$167,000

$50,000

Yates
217
Source: SHELDUS, 2013

0.46

113

4

7

$16,085,802

$109,259

0

0

0

$0

$0
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A significant winter storm generally occurs over more than a single day, with two days
being common and three days being rare. They can cause significant damage, for instance,
in March 1991, in western New York, a severe winter storm caused heavy ice accumulation
on tree branches, bending or breaking limbs and tree boles, or toppling trees. The resulting
tree debris disrupted power lines, blocked roads, and damaged residential and commercial
property. Subsequent disturbance can also occur when broken limbs or whole trees can
suddenly break and fall. These "widow makers" are high priority for removal after the
event to prevent personal injury.
Damage from the January 1998 ice storm event was extensive across northern New York,
northern New England and Canada. Over 17 million acres were impacted, with 5 million
acres experiencing severe damage. The combination of cold surface temperatures, warm
air aloft, and several days of rain contributed to the accumulation of more than four inches
of ice in some areas. Hardwoods suffered the greatest damage, as was evident in the areas
with many sugar maple trees. The magnitude of power disruption, debris removal,
emergency tree pruning and removal, and the resulting loss of the resources were
unprecedented. Further, the weakening of tree limbs during the storm left open the
possibility of similar damage from future weather related events.

Historical Winter Storm Events
Winter Storm Nemo – February 8-9, 2013
By February 9, 2013 Winter Storm Nemo dropped more than 12 inches of snow on Suffolk
County. Upstate New York encountered 10-12 inches of snow in the Hudson Valley and
Adirondacks, 12 inches fell in
Rochester, and 8 inches in Buffalo.
Approximately 10,000 homes and
businesses lost power on Long
Island.
Several vehicles were
stranded on the Long Island
Expressway overnight and police
had to use snowmobiles to reach
fire trucks, ambulances, police
vehicles, and some snowplow
trucks to rescue passengers. Roofs,
weighed down by the snow,
collapsed at a bowling alley and a
home in Suffolk County; however,
no one was injured. Winter Storm
Photo of Central Park New York, Blizzard of Feb. 2010; www.panoramio.com
Nemo claimed two lives.
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Blizzard of 2010 – December 26, 2010
On December 26, 2010, a Nor’easter dropped more than 20 inches of snow on New York
City. Strong winds pushed the falling snow into drifts that measured up to four feet.
Transportation suffered major delays as airports and rail shut down across the city and
Long Island. Travelers driving home from the holidays got stuck in the snow and
abandoned their vehicles. These abandoned vehicles made it difficult for the city’s plows to
clear the accumulating snow. The 2010-2011 winter went on to be one of the snowiest on
record, with 56.1 inches falling in January 2011 alone.
After the storm, OEM introduced a Snow Emergency Declaration to caution residents
against unnecessary driving during a snowstorm and keep roads clear for plows and
emergency vehicles.
Ice and Snowstorm – December 11-12, 2008
The precipitation came down heavy December 11th. By December 12th, ice accumulations
ranged from around half of an inch up to an inch across portions of the Capital District and
the Berkshires. Snowfall reports ranged from 2 to 4 inches just north and west of the
Capital District, where sleet mixed in along with lesser ice accumulations, up to 8 to 12
inches across portions of the southern Adirondacks. Widespread tree and power line
damage across the local area causing power outages across East Central New York. More
than 60,000 customers were out of power December 15th and power was not restored to
10,000+ customers until December 18th.
Snow Storm – February 13, 2007
A low pressure system developed over the southern plains on February 12th, and
intensified rapidly as it neared the East Coast on the night of the 13 th. The storm then
continued to strengthen as it moved up the Atlantic Seaboard during the day on February
14th. The storm spread snow into central New York beginning the evening of Tuesday, the
13th. The snow continued heavy at times through the 14th and gradually tapered off to snow
showers on the 15th as the storm pulled northeast past the Gulf of Maine. Some sleet mixed
with the snow for brief periods of time. The snow became heavy with near blizzard
conditions at times over the Finger Lakes and central southern tier of New York during the
early morning hours of the 14th. The heavy snow and near blizzard conditions shifted east
to the upper Susquehanna Region of New York and western Mohawk Valley by the
afternoon and evening of the 14th. Gusty winds to 40 mph developed behind the storm late
on the 14th and through the 15th which led to considerable blowing and drifting snow. This
hampered snow plowing and snow cleanup operations. As a result, many roads and
highways were closed during the height of the snowstorm. Many counties and
municipalities declared snow emergencies. Storm total snowfall amounts across much of
central New York ranged between 15 and 30 inches. Less snow fell in Sullivan County, New
York where more sleet was reported. This kept snowfall amounts down between 8 and 12
inches in this area. The heaviest snowfall from this storm occurred in Delaware and Otsego
3.15-14
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counties where between 2 and 3 feet was common. The highest snowfall was reported in
Roseboom where 39 inches of snow occurred and Springfield where 38 inches fell. The
weight of the snow caused several roofs to collapse.
Snow and Ice Storm – April 4, 2003
A stationary front was west to east across Pennsylvania during the 3rd and 4th of April.
Areas of low pressure moved along the front bringing precipitation to upstate New York. A
large area of high pressure, centered over Hudson Bay Canada helped to keep cold air at
the surface. The morning of the 5th low pressure moved northeast to Erie, Pennsylvania
then to northeast New York that evening. A trailing cold front brought with it an end to the
precipitation from west to east. Patchy freezing rain was across these counties first the
night of the 3rd into the 4th. At this time the freezing rain was most widespread in Northern
Oneida County. Steady widespread freezing rain started during the day of the 4 th across
Oneida, Onondaga, and Madison Counties. During the evening of the 4 th colder air spread
further south into the Finger Lakes and northern Susquehanna Region. This changed
moderate rain to freezing rain in these areas especially at the higher elevations. Across
northern Oneida County the freezing rain changed to snow. The snow accumulated up to
five inches. Ice accumulations were mostly a quarter to half an inch with a few locations up
to an inch. The Schuyler County Emergency Manager reported an inch of ice across most of
the county. Tens of thousands of electricity customers were without power, some for up to
a week. States of emergencies were declared for most of these counties.
Winter Storm – March 6, 1996
A winter storm formed over the Carolinas and tracked up the coast, bringing heavy snow to
central New York. Snowfall accumulations ranged from 6 to 12 inches by the time the snow
tapered off on the evening of the 7th. During the height of the storm, many accidents were
reported due to poor visibility, including one in which an elderly couple was killed and one
person injured in a collision in Lansing (Tompkins County). In Onondaga County, one man
was killed and one injured in a twocar accident in Marcellus. Two
people were injured near Rome in
Oneida County when their car
drove off the road, and six people
were injured in Homer, Cortland
County, when a tour bus drove off
Interstate 81 in near zero visibility.
Blizzard of 1993 – March 14-15,
1993
This blizzard virtually shut down
eastern New York on March 13th
and 14th. Also, record snows fell

The Blizzard of 1993; http://photos.syracuse.com/poststandard/2009/03/the_blizzard_of_1993_10.html
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from the Southern Tier of New York to the Catskills. In addition to the heavy snow, high
winds damaged structures and caused almost 200,000 power outages across the state. An
avalanche in the Catskills buried a county snow plow.
The Downslope Nor’easter – December 10-12, 1992
This storm produced incredible snowfall totals across many mountainous locations, while
barely having any effect on valley locations. Strong east winds caused the air to
"downslope" off the Berkshires and Taconics, and "dry it out." Snowfall totals in the
Berkshires ranged from 30 to 48 inches with drifts up to 12 feet. Schools were closed for a
week and the National Guard had to bring in heavy equipment to remove the snow. The
Catskills and Helderbergs also got their share of snow with 18 to 39 inches reported. On
Friday, December 11, at the height of the storm, the city of Albany received a half inch of
snow with temperatures in the middle 30's. Albany did eventually get 6", but most of that
fell toward the end of the storm, on Saturday the 12th, after the winds turned more
northerly.
Surprise October Snowstorm – October 4, 1987
The highest snowfall that ever fell in Albany in the month of October; heavy, extreme wet
snow fell on fully leaved trees. Fallen trees and down power lines blocked roads and
damaged homes. The extreme devastation left residents without power for up to two
weeks.
January Snowstorm of 1983 – January 15-16, 1983
Eastern New York was severely impacted by this storm. High accumulation of snow halted
travel across the area. Several auto accidents with injure were documented. Albany
reported 24.5 inches of snow and Saratoga County reported less than 30 inches.
Blizzard of 1978 - February 6-7, 1978
This storm affected Long Island and eastern New York. The storm produced strong wind
causing snow drifts; snow was reported up to 25 inches.
Thanksgiving Snowstorm of 1971 – November 24, 1971
Thanksgiving Eve snow fell and continued into the next day. Numerous travelers were
stranded on the busiest travel day of the year. The City of Albany picked up 22.5 inches;
other areas of New York reported up to 30 inches of snow.
Post-Christmas Snowstorm of 1969 – December 25-28-1969
Christmas night Albany encountered a storm system moving northward along the east
coast. The storm moved inland for a short period then headed back to sea December 28 th
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causing heavy, wet snowfall mixed with freezing rain. Snow removal was a challenge;
streets were not cleared for up to four weeks. A total of 26.7 inches fell making this the
third greatest storm on record.
Blizzard of 1966 – January 29-31, 1966
This storm is known for its blizzard conditions from intense lake squalls that developed as
arctic air streamed across Lake Ontario. Oswego County reported 75 inches, with some
unofficial reports of around 100 inches in that vicinity. Rome, which is approximately 75
miles from Lake Ontario, received 41 inches and Albany County received a foot of snow
over a two day period.
Worst Snow Storm on Record – December 4-5, 1964
Freezing rain caused ice accumulations of up to 1.5 inches paralyzing east central New
York. Residents had no power for up to two weeks and schools were shut down for a week.
The State incurred damages close to $5 million.
Blizzard of 1958 – February 5-16, 1958
A Nor’easter blew 30 inches of snow across the Catskills dropping 17.9 inches in Albany.
Snow blocked the majority of roadways making travel impossible. Cattle were stranded;
helicopters dropped food to them, in Operation “Haylift”.
Great Appalachian Storm – November 24-25, 1950
Rain and snow were associated with this storm; however, wind gusts were recorded in
Albany up to 83 mph, with sustained winds of 50-60 mph. Two very high pressure centers
produced an extremely tight pressure gradient, one east of Labrador and the other over the
Mississippi Valley.
Wind damage was
critical in New York State causing downed
power lines and trees throughout the
region. The state incurred damage totaling
more than 20 million dollars.
Blizzard of 1888 – March 11-14, 1888

Blizzard of 1888, New York City's 11th Street;
http://myinwood.net/a-buried-city-the-blizzard-of-1888/

All blizzards are measured by this event. It
was considered the “worst storm in living
memory in the northeast”. The City of
Albany was shut down. There was no heat,
road closures, and doctors were unable to
make house calls. Light snow began midafternoon March 11th accumulating to 3
inches by midnight.
Snow intensified
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overnight, accumulating 18 inches of snow by day break. Total snowfall by March 14th was
46.7 inches, the drifts were significantly higher.

Probability of Future Winter Storm Events
Severe winter storm events in New York State are virtually guaranteed yearly since the
State is located at relatively high latitudes resulting in winter temperatures that range
between 0oF and 32oF for a good deal of the fall through early spring season (late October
until mid-April). Additionally, the State is exposed to large quantities of moisture from
both the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean. While it is almost certain that a number of
significant winter storms will occur during the winter and fall season, what is not easily
determined is how many such storms will occur during that time frame.
NYS uses Hazards New York (HAZNY) as its methodology to rank natural and man-made
disasters, which focuses on preparedness and response; for the purpose of mitigation NYS
uses a modified version of HAZNY to rank hazards in relation to their potential for
mitigation. Based on Table 3.2a in Section 3.2, the HAZNY-Mitigation hazard ranking
table; local jurisdictions rank severe winter storms as a low risk hazard. Mitigation
activities such as, plowing snow, salting roadways and maintaining trees for severe winter
storms are handled at the local level.
According to the data provided in Table 3.15b, Historical and Recent Severe Winter Storm
Events and Losses, the counties with the highest probability for future occurrences are
noted in Table 3.15d.
Table 3.15d: Future Probability of Severe Winter Storm Events
County

Future Probability (%)

St. Lawrence
Oswego
Lewis
Essex
Franklin
Clinton
Oneida

719
715
637
627
623
610
610
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Justification for Minimal Vulnerability/Loss Assessment

Severe Winter Storm occurrences in New York State are typically regional in scale; and,
while past occurrences have resulted in loss of life, the scale of impacts and consequences
are isolated compared to flood and hurricane events, and are typically within the
capabilities of the impacted jurisdictions to prepare, respond, and recover. Severe Winter
Storm was ranked as “low” with a HAZNY-Mitigation score of 18, based on severity of
impact and mitigation potential. (Section 3.0 describes the hazard ranking methodology
used to determine this finding.) Therefore, it is determined that there is not sufficient
evidence that Severe Winter Storm has a high level of overall risk to population and
property that has potential for mitigation to justify further analysis for the 2014 Plan
update.
The information provided in the Risk Assessment sections below serves as guidance for
impact and consequence analysis and local hazard mitigation planning.

3.15.2
Assessing Winter Storm
Potential Losses by Jurisdiction

Vulnerability

and

Estimating

According to the NOAA National Severe Storms Laboratory (NSSL); every year, winter
weather indirectly and deceptively kills hundreds of people in the U.S., primarily from
automobile accidents, overexertion and exposure. Winter storms are often accompanied
by strong winds creating blizzard conditions with blinding wind-driven snow, drifting
snow and extreme cold temperatures and dangerous wind chill. They are considered
deceptive killers because most deaths and other impacts or losses are indirectly related to
the storm. People can die in traffic accidents on icy roads, heart attacks while shoveling
snow, or of hypothermia from prolonged exposure to cold. Heavy accumulations of ice can
bring down trees and power lines, disabling electric power and communications for days
or weeks. Heavy snow can immobilize a region and paralyze a city, shutting down all air
and rail transportation and disrupting medical and emergency services. Storms near the
coast can cause coastal flooding and beach erosion as well as sink ships at sea. The
economic impact of winter weather each year is huge, with costs for snow removal, damage
and loss of business in the millions (NSSL, 2006).
Table 3.15e provides the annualized losses for severe winter storm events. The data used
was based on SHELDUS records from 1960-2012, with the exception of hurricane,
earthquake, and flood hazards which were derived from HAZUS-MH 2.1. For those specific
hazards, a probabilistic run was generated to determine the total annual losses for each
county found within the State. The information provided by SHELDUS was determined by
taking the total economic losses divided by the number of years of record (52) to obtain the
losses per year. Figure 3.15d, illustrates the top ten counties annualized losses with a
total of $34,845,157 in severe winter storm losses for the entire State of New York.
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Table 3.15e: Average Annual Severe Winter Storm Losses by County 1960-2012
County

Winter Storm

County

Winter Storm

County

Winter Storm

Monroe

$

1,154,762

Westchester

$

603,133

Chautauqua

$

387,461

Erie

$

1,101,559

Rockland

$

601,267

Wyoming

$

378,622

Genesee

$

1,078,850

Oneida

$

537,995

Ontario

$

368,315

Herkimer

$

1,043,925

St Lawrence

$

535,344

Cattaraugus

$

364,813

Niagara

$

1,026,642

Otsego

$

532,474

Cayuga

$

349,312

Orange

$

1,005,216

Madison

$

531,461

Yates

$

311,443

Montgomery

$

1,000,380

Livingston

$

529,226

Allegany

$

281,434

Delaware

$

979,904

Wayne

$

506,434

Steuben

$

215,232

Columbia

$

975,316

Franklin

$

491,329

Onondaga

$

178,720

Dutchess

$

964,390

Hamilton

$

491,161

Schuyler

$

161,962

Putnam

$

958,774

Tioga

$

488,635

Seneca

$

160,222

Orleans

$

958,289

Clinton

$

488,311

Tompkins

$

109,952

Ulster

$

949,742

Essex

$

487,892

Chemung

$

69,564

Saratoga

$

949,004

Chenango

$

484,141

Suffolk

$

62,222

Greene

$

940,392

Schoharie

$

475,489

Bronx

$

61,295

Sullivan

$

938,156

Cortland

$

472,516

Kings

$

61,130

Schenectady

$

934,101

Jefferson

$

461,125

Nassau

$

61,130

Albany

$

933,285

Fulton

$

454,928

Queens

$

61,130

Rensselaer

$

924,906

Broome

$

446,842

New York

$

61,120

Warren

$

921,019

Oswego

$

415,289

Richmond

$

61,024

Washington

$

913,711

Lewis

$

391,740

Total

$34,845,157

Source: SHELDUS, 2013
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Figure 3.15d: Average Annual Severe Winter Storm Losses by County 1960-2012
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Over the past 52 years 11,876 severe winter storm events occurred throughout NYS.
Counties reporting the highest amount of property damage were Monroe, Erie, Genesee,
Herkimer, and Niagara collectively exceeding more than $276 million in property damage.
Figure 3.15e shows the total cost of property damage caused by severe winter storm
events from 1960-2012.
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Figure 3.15e: New York Winter Property Damage by County 1960-2012
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Based on the historical and recent severe winter storm events and loss data assessed by the
NYS mitigation team all 62 New York State counties have been affected by severe winter
storm events over the past 52 years.
Tables 3.15f: Summary of Winter Storm Hazard Impacts and Rankings by County
Local County Winter Storm Hazard Impacts
Highest Occurrences
St. Lawrence
Oswego
Lewis
Essex
Franklin
Source: SHELDUS

Highest Fatalities
Oneida
New York
Dutchess
Otsego
Herkimer

Highest Property Damage
Monroe
Erie
Genesee
Herkimer
Niagara

Local County Winter Storm Hazard Rankings
High

Moderately High

Broome, Cayuga, Franklin, Fulton, Greene,
Montgomery, Orleans, Saratoga, Suffolk, and Tioga

Albany, Allegany, Cattaraugus, Delaware, Essex,
Jefferson, Lewis, Madison, Monroe, Onondaga,
Ontario, Oswego, Otsego, Rensselaer, Schenectady,
Seneca, Sullivan, Ulster, Warren, Wayne, and
Wyoming

Source: LHMP

Development in hazard prone areas
NYS will always be vulnerable to severe winter events; because of its geographic location.
Leading up to the winter months, the State does focus on preparedness and response, but
mitigation strategies and measures are developed and executed by each local jurisdiction.
On the local level, economic impact may be felt by increased consumption of heating fuel,
which can lead to energy shortages and higher prices. House fires and resulting deaths
tend to occur more frequently from increased and improper use of alternate heating
sources. Fires during these events also present a greater danger because water supplies
may freeze and impede firefighting efforts.
Additional, heavy snow can immobilize a region and paralyze a city, stranding commuters,
stopping the flow of supplies, and disrupting emergency and medical services.
Accumulations of snow can collapse buildings and knock down trees and power lines. In
rural areas, homes and farms may be isolated for days, and unprotected livestock may be
lost. In the mountains, heavy snow can lead to avalanches. The cost of snow removal,
repairing damages, and loss of business can have large economic impacts on cities and
towns. Heavy accumulations of ice can bring down trees, electrical wires, telephone poles
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and lines, and communication towers. Communications and power can be disrupted for
days while utility companies work to repair the extensive damage. Even small
accumulations of ice may cause extreme hazards to motorists and pedestrians. Bridges and
overpasses are particularly dangerous because they freeze before other surfaces (NSSL,
2006).
Because severe winter storms are not limited to geographic boundaries or population
groups, it is difficult to identify development and population trends that impact this hazard.
Current NYS land use and building codes incorporate standards that address and mitigate
snow accumulation. Several local jurisdictions have implemented the following activities
to eliminate loss of life and damage to property and infrastructure during the severe winter
events:









Remove snow from roadways.
Remove dead trees and trim trees/brush from road ways to lessen falling limbs and
trees.
Ensure proper road signage is visible and installed properly.
Bury electrical and telephone utility lines to minimize downed lines.
Remove debris/obstructions in waterways and develop routine
inspections/maintenance plans to reduce potential flooding.
Replace substandard roofs of critical facilities (such as hospitals) to reduce exposure
to airborne germs resulting from leakage.
Purchase and install backup generators in evacuation facilities and critical facilities
to essential services to residents.
Install cell towers in areas where limited telecommunication is available to increase
emergency response efforts and cell phone coverage.

Statewide Winter Storm Preparedness Maintenance Program
NYS does maintain State highways for accessibility during winter events. The New York
State Thruway Authority (Authority) implements its aggressive winter maintenance
program. During periods of inclement winter weather the program’s goal is to provide
customers a roadway that is safely drivable at reasonable speeds, with the ultimate goal of
returning to bare pavement as quickly as
possible. Each fall the New York State
Thruway
Authority
(Authority)
implements
its
aggressive
winter
maintenance program. During periods of
inclement winter weather the program’s
goal is to provide customers a roadway
that is safely drivable at reasonable
speeds, with the ultimate goal of returning
to bare pavement as quickly as possible.
Winter preparations begin in the spring

Source: New York State Thruway Authority
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with the start of the Authority’s annual preventive maintenance program on all plow trucks
and winter maintenance equipment. Further preparations include renewing or
establishing salt contracts, procuring needed equipment and supplies, and ensuring a
trained and adequately staffed workforce.
The Authority’s four Divisions: New York, Albany, Syracuse and Buffalo are tasked with the
operational response to winter weather events. Each of the Authority’s 21 maintenance
locations is responsible for snow and ice operations over approximately 30 miles of
roadway, as well as the accompanying interchanges, service areas and related
facilities. Operations are set to achieve approximately one hour cycle times for plowing
and spreading the roadway, although this can vary substantially due to traffic, weather and
other factors.
The Authority has approximately 200 large plow trucks to plow snow and to disperse
salt. In addition, each location also has a complement of smaller plow trucks and other
ancillary equipment such as front-end loaders and skid steer mounted snowblowers. Every
piece of equipment undergoes a thorough preventive maintenance service between each
winter season. These efforts are generally completed by late October. By the start of the
winter schedule, all material spreaders are mounted on trucks and calibration for proper
salt application rates is complete. Additionally, the Authority owns five large truck
mounted snowblowers. These units are stationed strategically across the system and
relocated as forecasts and conditions dictate. In addition, there are 15 smaller skid steer
mounted snowblowers that are used for more routine snow removal needs.
The Authority’s primary weapon to fight roadway icing is rock salt. The average annual
usage for the past ten years is approximately 180,000 tons. The Authority’s 38 storage
locations provide for the secure covered storage of approximately 128,100 tons of
salt. Sheds are filled prior to the start of winter and salt is reordered as usage occurs
throughout the season. With dedicated Authority salt contracts and timely ordering to
replenish stockpiles, adequate salt supplies are guaranteed absent the most severe of
winters.
In addition to rock salt, the Authority utilizes straight salt brine and a beet brine mixture in
both an anti-icing application and as a pre-treatment for the rock salt. Other liquids such as
calcium chloride and magnesium chloride are utilized to improve effectiveness at lower
temperatures. This program demonstrates the State’s role and capabilities in preparedness
and response to winter storm events.

3.15.3

Assessing Winter Storm Vulnerability of State Facilities

Found in Section 3.1.6 is a full description of the current status and data limitations to
state-owned facilities and critical infrastructures for New York State.
A comprehensive analysis of state facilities has not been undertaken for this hazard in the
2014 update; the 2011 plan provides a methodology and data for a gross estimate of
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potential snow losses to identified vulnerable State facilities in terms of dollar value of
exposed property. While the data in Table 3.38: State Facilities – Assessing
Vulnerability and Estimating Loss for Snow Hazard (see 2014 Plan Update, Appendix
3, Attachment A: Data Supplement) is not current, the process followed to create a GIS
layer for State facilities using the coordinate information and overlay onto a snow hazard
layer developed using NOAA NCDC annual average snowfall data is still valid. The intention
of this analysis was to assess vulnerability and provide an aggregate exposure of State
facilities as a proxy for a potential loss estimate. The analysis methodology had limitations
for complete accuracy, and applicability of the results was not considered to be highly
reliable beyond a general indication. Instead, the analysis results and process may best be
used as a guide to help target those facilities that might benefit from further analysis and is,
consequently, included in the 2014 update.
Unlike flood or earthquake hazard, there are no standard loss estimation models or
methodologies for the snow hazard. A preliminary dollar loss estimate could have been
calculated based on known information such as total structures for general occupancy
class, indicated higher snow hazard areas (average annual and extreme snowfall potential
map and data) as determined earlier in this plan, and use of residential structure dollar
value estimates. However, many assumptions and generalizations would need to be made
for several unknowns.
Unknowns or data that are available but not prepared or analyzed include: inventory
estimates of the more vulnerable structures such as those pre-building code structures, flat
roof structures, and historical or critical structures, and the type of damage and dollar
damage figures. The many generalizations and guess work would result in figures with
little accuracy, and potentially misleading indications of a jurisdiction’s vulnerability and
potential loss to the snow hazard. Therefore, this version of the NYS risk assessment
instead includes an identification of needed data and establishes actions necessary to
gather data needed to estimate potential losses. As local mitigation plans with snow hazard
risk assessment data become available, this information will be incorporated into a state
risk assessment repository for integration into future vulnerability analyses. Additionally,
application of GIS technology will continue, including exploring the possibility of obtaining
and incorporating certain data that may better define the high hazard area characteristics
such as more comprehensive snowfall extremes data, and real property data layers in
support of future snow hazard vulnerability analysis.
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3.15.4 Data Limitations, Sources and Key Documents
The profile outlined in this section has been developed from the following sources:










Northeast Regional Climate Center (NRCC) based at Cornell University,
http://nysc.eas.cornell.edu/climate_of_ny.html
NOAA Satellite and Information Services and National Climate Data Center,
http://www4.ncdc.noaa.gov/cgi-win/wwcgi.dll?wwevent~storms
NYS Emergency Management Office (NYSEMO), www.dhses.ny.gov
National
Weather
Service’s
Cooperative
Observer
Program
(COOP),
www.nws.noaa.gov/om/coop
New York State Thruway Authority, www.thruway.ny.gov/
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), www.fema.gov
Kocin, P. J. and L. W. Uccellini, 2004: A Snowfall Impact Scale Derived From Northeast
Storm Snowfall Distributions. Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 85, 177-194
Squires, M. F. and J. H. Lawrimore, 2006: Development of an Operational Snowfall
Impact Scale. 22nd IIPS, Atlanta, GA.
Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Databases for the United States (SHELDUS)

Please Note: Data obtained from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States
(SHELDUS™). SHELDUS is a county-level hazard data set for the U.S. for 18 different natural hazard event types
such thunderstorms, hurricanes, floods, and tornados. For each event the database includes the beginning date,
location (county and state), property losses, crop losses, injuries, and fatalities that affected each county. The
data derives from the national data source, National Climatic Data Center's monthly Storm Data publications.
Using the latest release of SHELDUS™ 12.0, the database includes every loss causing and/or deadly event
between 1960 through 1992 and from 1995 onward. Between 1993 and 1995, SHELDUS™ reflects only events
that caused at least one fatality or more than $50,000 in property or crop damages.
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ATTACHMENT E
PENNDOT INCIDENT MANAGEMENT AFTER-ACTION REVIEW
MEETING AGENDA

Incident Management After-Action Review Meeting Agenda
PennDOT Organization ______________________
Date: ____________________________________
Time : ___________________________________
Conference Call No.: ________________________
The purpose of this meeting is to discuss past response efforts and ways to improve response in the
future.
Invited Attendees (Sample):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

PennDOT District Incident Management Coordinator
PennDOT On-Scene Responder and/or Assistant County Maintenance Managers
PennDOT Central Office Incident Management Coordinator (Optional, but provide a copy of the
meeting minutes)
PennDOT District Emergency Management Coordinator (Optional)
PennDOT District TMC Manager or Traffic Engineer
Pennsylvania State Police Incident Commander
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper
Pennsylvania State Police Bureau of Patrol (Optional)
County Emergency Management Agency
Fire Chief or Assistant (Optional)
Local/Township Police (Optional)

1. Welcome/Attendance – PennDOT Facilitator
2. Report on Past Event(s)- Field Responders
•
•
•
•

Identify field objectives for the event(s)
Identify field issues –incident response/clearing, detour routes
Identify TMC/agency support issues – incident detection/verification, motorist notification
Identify good practices – from the issues above

3. Discuss Ways to Improve (consider the following) – All Responders and Agency Representatives
•
•
•
•
•

Incident Detection
Incident Information/Verification
Incident Response/Clearance
Notifying Motorists
Detouring Vehicles

4. Open Discussion – PennDOT Facilitator/All
•
•
•

Remaining Communications/Documentation Issues
Remaining Equipment Needs
Upcoming Training Requirements/Opportunities

•
•
•

Other situational awareness or concerns
Creation of New Action Items
Next Meeting Date

After Action Report must be submitted to Central Office Incident Management Section for review and
feedback.

Lead state:
Minnesota Department of Transportation
Research Services
395 John Ireland Blvd.
St. Paul, MN 55155

